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BEYOND RELATIONAL CONTRACTS: SOCIAL
CAPITAL AND NETWORK GOVERNANCE IN
PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS

Lisa Bernstein*

The master agreements that nominally govern the transactions between mid-western
OEMs and their suppliers are not, for the most part, designed to create legal obligations.
Rather, like the role played by ﬁrm boundaries in the Coase-Williamson theory of the ﬁrm,
they create a space in which private order can ﬂourish. This article explores how sophisticated transactors in this market have combined governance techniques associated
with arm’s-length contracting, intra-ﬁrm hierarchy, and trust-based relational contracting to create relationships that are long-term, highly cooperative, and characterized by
signiﬁcant relationship-speciﬁc investment. It suggests that these transactors have been
able to accomplish these outcomes with only minimal reliance on the legal system, in
large part because they operate in a market of highly interconnected ﬁrms—a network
that itself functions as a contract governance mechanism. It then explores the
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ABSTRACT
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implications of these contract structures and the availability of network governance for
ﬁrms’ make-or-buy decisions and the likelihood of innovation.

1. INTRODUCTION

1

Bernstein (1992) (discussing private ordering in New York’s 47th Street diamond markets).

2

Bernstein (2001) (describing private ordering in the cash cotton markets).

3

Bernstein (1996) (describing private ordering in the grain and feed business).

4

Contracts, however, remain important to establishing and protecting intellectual property rights and
ownership of physical assets (like tooling).

5

Unless otherwise explicitly noted, quotes from mid-western OEMs and their suppliers were taken
from hundreds of pages of transcripts of interviews conducted by Josh Whitford and his collaborators that are described in Whitford (2006, Appendix A1). Due to restrictions placed on the original
study by an institutional review board, identifying details about the interviewees have been replaced
by general descriptions of the firm’s type along with the designation “NOE Respondent.”

6

A similar argument has been made about the function of the legal doctrines of employment at will,
see Epstein (1984), and the business judgment rule. See Rock & Wachter (2001).
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Large mid-western original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) have devised
contractual structures to govern their relationships with their suppliers that,
while nominally contractual in the traditional sense, are better understood as
private order institutions. Like diamond merchants,1 cotton merchants,2 and
grain merchants,3 who have largely opted out of the public legal system by
creating trade-association-run private legal systems to resolve disputes and
support trade among their members, these buyers have structured their supplier
relationships in ways that make the legal system largely irrelevant to their contracting relationships.4 Although the contracts used to consummate these transactions are long and detailed, they are not designed to create incentives for
performance and breach primarily through the prospect of court-imposed
monetary damages. Rather, they are designed to keep the law—in the sense
of legal enforcement of contractual obligations—largely out of their relationship with their suppliers. As one OEM explained, “We have a Master Supply
Agreement [with our suppliers, yet it] is not a contract to buy. It is an agreement as to how we are going to do business.”5
Conceptually, the master supply agreements (MSAs) that formally govern these transactions play a role in supply relationships that is similar to the
role that is played by firm boundaries in the Coase–Williamson theory of the
firm: they clear a space for other, extralegal modes of contract governance to
work.6
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This article explores the ways that the sophisticated transactors in these markets have combined the governance techniques associated with arm’s-length
contracting, intra-firm hierarchy, and trust-based relational contracting to
create relationships that are long-term, highly cooperative, and involve adequate levels of specific investment. It suggests that these transactors have
been able to accomplish these outcomes with only minimal reliance on the
legal system, in large part because they operate in a market of highly interconnected firms—a network that itself functions as a contract governance mechanism. When network governance is available, it makes other contract
administration mechanisms more powerful and broadens the self-enforcing
range of contractual obligations. It also expands the types of behavior that
can be sanctioned through reputational harm or rewarded through reputational
or other nonlegal benefits—extending it to include behavior that could not be
sanctioned or rewarded through contract. As a consequence of these and other
effects, the availability of network governance enables transactors to credibly
commit to obligations that, in the absence of the network, could not be adequately bonded through either legally enforceable arms-length agreements or
long-term relational contracts.
More broadly, the article suggests that a firm’s make-or-buy decisions may be
influenced by whether the firm and its putative suppliers are part of a highly
interconnected network of firms. When network governance is available and
transactors are also able to avail themselves of contract administration mechanisms that recreate many of the governance benefits of intra-firm hierarchy,
the functional domain of “buy” may be far broader than it is assumed to be in
the classic Coase–Williamson theory of the firm. This expanded domain of buy
together with the recognition that the local network around a supplier (that is,
the firms it buys from and sells to directly) may influence the likelihood that it
will be able to innovate on the buyer’s behalf, suggests that OEMs’ make-or-buy
decisions may be driven not only by transaction costs as traditionally defined,
but also by the network structure of the relevant market, the network position
of available suppliers, and the OEM’s need for innovation.
In sum, understanding the ways these agreements are governed suggests that
their goal is not merely to secure performance of the promises they contain.
Rather, and perhaps more importantly, these agreements are artfully designed
to create a framework for growing relational social capital and leveraging network governance—a framework that is likely to succeed in creating the conditions that will better enable transactors to identify and bond value-creating
exchanges in the future. Given this, modern commercial lawyers who want to
draft contracts that will promote the creation of the greatest value for their
clients over time, must take into account the network structure of the market in
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7

More specifically, lawyers will need to develop different contractual structures for deals where their
clients are transacting in the network-free context depicted on the left of the figure below and deals
that take place in the type of deeply embedded network context depicted on the right.
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which their clients operate, as well as buyer and supplier’s past relationship and
position in that network, to achieve this goal.7
Section 2 of this article provides an overview of the MSAs used in OEM–
supplier relationships. It discusses the contractual and practical limits on the
monetary damages they make available and describes the interior remedies
created by buyers to increase the likelihood that suppliers will perform as
promised. It also explores a variety of ways that these agreements effectively
recreate the governance methods commonly associated with intra-firm hierarchy within these contractual relationships.
Section 3 looks at the contract administration mechanisms that, together
with certain terms in the master agreements and attention to network position,
create the conditions that enable cooperative contracting relationships for producing goods to a buyer’s specifications to arise and endure.
Section 4 draws on interview evidence from a study of OEM–supplier relationships in the upper mid-west, as well as empirical studies of procurement contracts
and strategic alliances, to explore how make-to-spec contracts evolve into highly
relational contracts. It suggests that as transactors successfully work through the
inevitable bumps in their initial contracts, they begin to exchange information and
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8

This article uses the term “structural social capital” to refer to the advantage that accrues to a firm or
person from their position in a network with a particular structure. It uses the term “relational social
capital” to refer to the relationship-specific trust and understanding that emerges between two
individuals or two firms. In the sociology literature, “structural social capital” is sometimes referred
to simply as “social capital,” see Burt, Kilduff & Tasselli (2013, 529) (“Network forms associated with
advantage constitute social capital”), or as “structural embeddedness.” In that literature “relational
social capital” is also referred to as “relational embeddedness.” See Moran (2005) (describing the
genesis and definition of these terms). Other authors refer to social capital as having relational,
structural, and sometimes cognitive dimensions. See Nahapiet & Ghoshal (1998).
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to develop the type of relationship-specific social capital that gives rise to both
interpersonal and interorganizational trust. Over time, as a consequence of these
interactions, transactors become better able to both identify additional valuecreating deals and partially bond more complex undertakings (like the codevelopment of new products) for which it is much harder, if not impossible,
to write a contract with objective metrics for determining breach or performance.
Section 5 introduces the concept of network governance. It explores the ways
that the network position of both the buyer and supplier (sometimes referred to
as “structural social capital”8) can be understood as a distinct contract governance mechanism—one that can substitute for contract provisions or complement and strengthen them—and discusses in more depth the ways that the
availability of network governance may affect contractual relationships and the
types of credible commitments transactors can make. It discusses the way that
some firms have sought not only to leverage the force of network governance,
but also to actively create it by encouraging the formation of smaller local
networks (such as relational ties among their suppliers) to bond obligations
that cannot be adequately bonded through the law, the forces of repeat dealing,
or network governance writ large.
Section 6 is more speculative. Drawing on foundational insights from network
analysis, it discusses the ways that a supplier’s local network might influence the
likelihood that it will be able to innovate in coordination with, or on behalf of, a
buyer. It then suggests that the need for quicker and more frequent innovation
may be a reason that these OEMs have shifted from vertical integration to outsourcing, despite the costs of governing these highly relational contracts, a cost
that markedly increases when supplier-led innovation is expected.
Section 7 concludes. It suggests that an appreciation of the ways that contract
provisions and other contract governance mechanisms interact with social capital and network position, together with a clearer understanding of the true
costs and benefits of relational contracting, will enable firms to make more
informed make-or-buy decisions. In addition, it will enable commercial lawyers
to construct more effective contract governance mechanisms when firms do
decide to outsource production.

566 ~ Bernstein: “Network Governance”

2. THE WEAK SHADOW OF THE LAW

2.1 MSAs and Traditional Legal Remedies

Many MSAs used in the largest deals are structured as long-term agreements with
fixed or variable quantity provisions. In most small- or medium-sized deals,
however, the MSAs omit a quantity provision.12 They are, therefore, legally unenforceable until a purchase order specifying a quantity is sent and accepted.13
When this structure is used, the transactors contemplate a long-term relationship, but divide it into a series of smaller transactions that the supplier
9 Many MSAs allocate ownership of specialized machines used in the supplier’s plants to the buyer.
Buyers are given the right to inspect the machines and suppliers are required to clearly mark the
machines as the buyer’s property, insure them, and provide buyers with periodic maintenance
reports. These agreements are an important feature of these deals; they may mitigate (though not
eliminate) the potential for the types of hold-up problems identified by theorists of the firm. They
also may reduce the risks faced by a buyer in the event of a supplier’s bankruptcy. See Baird & Casey
(2013, pp. 39–42).
10 Harley-Davidson, Doing Business with Harley-Davidson (2015, “Master Supply Agreement”
module). The Harley contract is structured as a series of “modules,” each dealing with a different
aspect of the relationship.
11 NOE Respondent.
12 Some MSAs state very clearly that they involve no commitment on the part of the buyer to purchase
anything. See, e.g., Master Supply Agreement between Sun Microsystems Inc. and Mitac International
Corporation (2007, Sec. 3.1) (“[N]either this Agreement nor any Award Letter or Blanket Purchase
Order will constitute a commitment to purchase any particular quantity of Products. Sun shall only
be committed to purchase Products . . . when Sun has tendered a purchase order to Supplier in
accordance with an Award Letter.”).
13 Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the statute that governs transactions in the sale of
goods, a contract must have a quantity provision to be legally enforceable. U.C.C. § 2–201 (1977).
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Outsourcing relationships between large mid-western OEMs like John Deere
and parts suppliers are typically governed by MSAs. These lengthy agreements
cover many of the core legal aspects of a supply contract—such as limitations
on liability, warranty, confidentiality, modification, ownership of tooling and
machines,9 insurance, cure, and intellectual property. However, neither the
OEMs nor their suppliers view these agreements as creating a set of obligations
to be enforced in court. Rather, they view them as creating a framework for a
contracting relationship. As Harley Davidson’s MSA itself explains, “Th[is]
MSA . . . describes in general terms how we work together with our suppliers . . . . [It] is not a long-term commitment; rather it is a commitment
about how we will operate in the long-term.”10 And, as one supplier explained,
reflecting a similar conception of the role of contract, “the contract is just a
formalized handshake that says that your intention is to put business in here.”11
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14 See, e.g., Deere, Terms and Conditions, https://jdsn.deere.com/wps/wcm/connect/71fad4004d1bd53
5930dbba912093b63/purchasing_terms_and_conditions_can_eng.pdf ?MOD¼AJPERES. (“Buyer
may terminate this Order for its convenience, in whole or in part . . . at any time. If this Order is
terminated for convenience, any claim of seller shall be settled on the basis of reasonable costs
incurred by seller in the performance of this Order.”).
15 This clause is taken from an MSA between a large publicly traded supplier and an OEM (names
withheld upon request). See also Long Term Supply Agreement between Deere & Stanadyne (August
14, 2007) at Cl. VI (“Competition Clause”). Moreover, even when these clauses are not included in
the MSA, their terms are the de facto reality facing suppliers. As one supplier explained, even when a
long-term contract of a specified duration was used, “most customers have come back in and
violated those kind of agreements . . . [they] say, we know we negotiated this deal, however, business
conditions have changed and we need your help, partner, to help us out of this situation . . . so,
long-term contracts, they sound nice and are nice things to talk about, but we have found that there
are problems in our customers adhering to those contracts.” NOE Respondent.
16 Interview with Manager at a Large Supplier (December 2015).
17 See, e.g., Deere & Company Supplier Quality Manual (JDS6223, rev. 2009-03-12, Sec. 4 “Quality
Management System) (hereinafter “Deere QM”) (“[A]cceptance of a John Deere purchase order
constitutes acceptance of the requirements of this manual.”).
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understands will continue as long as its performance and pricing are competitive.
In practice, however, these transactional structures are quite similar. Long-term
MSAs often give buyers the right to terminate for “convenience” so long as the
supplier is reimbursed for its reliance expenses.14 Many also have “competitionout” clauses. These clauses provide that if “a particular part . . . is not a competitive value [for the buyer] in price, performance, delivery, reliability, quality and
technology with other equivalent parts of equivalent value, usage, or availability
in the world,” the supplier has 90 days to submit an “action plan and time frame”
to meet the price and other product attributes.15 If he cannot or will not meet the
competition, the buyer has the right to terminate the contract and buy the part
from another supplier. As a consequence of these provisions, the continuation of
even long-term agreements depends on the buyer’s satisfaction with the supplier’s performance, not merely on whether the supplier technically fulfills its
contractual obligations. As one supplier explained, “you get these MSAs with 28
pages and 34 addendums, but in reality their value boils down to their termination and meet the competition clauses.”16
Most MSAs are supplemented by additional sources of written obligations.
Statements of Work or Service Level Agreements that are negotiated by managers (not lawyers) provide detailed technical specifications, information about
the way conformity with product and delivery parameters will be assessed, and
penalties for nonperformance or substandard performance. Additional boilerplate terms are added by the purchase orders. And, perhaps most importantly,
these agreements also explicitly incorporate the lengthy sets of terms contained
in buyer-drafted Supplier Quality Manuals,17 Supplier Codes of Conduct
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18 Deere (2015) (setting out suppliers’ obligations with respect to “Child Labor . . . Forced
Labor . . . Hiring and Employment Practices,” including “compensation and working hours,” as
well as environmental impact, and other matters).
19 See, e.g., Ingersoll Rand, Inc. Global Supplier Quality Manual (GPO-Q-SW-001 rev. 1) (2014, Sec.
2.0) (“In the event of a conflict . . . the various components of the agreements shall be given the
following precedence (in descending Order of precedence): . . . the Supply Agreement . . . a purchase
order . . . an applicable country/region supplement to the buyer’s terms and conditions of purchase . . . the buyer’s terms and conditions of purchase and . . . the Global Supplier Quality
Manual.”).
20 See, e.g., Supply Agreement between Dresser-Rand and Ingersoll-Rand (October 31, 2004) at Cl. 10
(limiting the recovery of these damages even if they were foreseeable); Manufacturing and Supply
agreement between DSM Pharmaceuticals and AAI Pharma (January 26, 2004) (excluding various
types of damages and capping liability during the contract’s first year to five million dollars and the
liability thereafter to “TWO (2) TIMES THE AGGREGATE PURCHASE PRICE FOR PRODUCT
SUPPLIED DURING THE LAST TWELVE (12) MONTHS OF THIS AGREEMENT”); Sun
Microsystems Agreement, supra note 12 (limiting liability for both torts and breaches of contract,
“TO THE GREATER OF TWO MILLION US DOLLARS (US$2,000,000) OR TWO TIMES (2X)
THE TOTAL FEES PAID BY SUN FOR THE PRODUCT OVER THE LIFE OF THE
AGREEMENT.”); Interview with New York Outsourcing Lawyer (November 2015) (noting that
it was very common to cap damages at some low multiple of the contract price in OEM-supplier
contracts and that when such caps were not included, OEMs were generally aware that they would
have trouble collecting full damages from small or medium-sized suppliers).
21 Most of these agreements have separate provisions dealing with damages for breach of warranty and
“epidemic failure” of components. An “epidemic failure” is a failure of a component or assembly at a
rate defined in the MSA, see, e.g., Sun Microsystems Agreement, supra note 12 at Sec. 18.4.1, that
greatly impairs the value of the buyer’s final product to his customers, typically causing health or
safety-related harms that have a damaging effect on the buyer’s reputation. Most MSAs require the
supplier to insure against such events and name the buyer as the beneficiary of the insurance policy.
See, e.g., Deere and Stanadyne Agreement, supra note 15 at Sec. XIX “Insurance” (requiring
Stanadyne to maintain certain types of product liability insurance for at least ten years following
production of the product and noting that the policies must name Deere as a beneficiary and be
issued by a company meeting certain financial criteria).
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(or Ethics),18 and Environmental Handbooks. Among other things, these handbooks contain detailed manufacturing process specifications, ethical sourcing
requirements, environmental responsibility guidelines, and a description of the
roles the buyer’s employees are entitled to play in the supplier’s production
process. Any conflicts between the provisions of these writings are resolved by
reference to the agreement’s stated hierarchy of authority.19
MSAs vary in terms of their limitations on court-awarded monetary damages. Many limit damages to the contract price or some low multiple of it, or
exclude recovery of lost profits as well as both incidental and consequential
damages.20 Others contain no such limitations. In practice, however, buyers are
aware that for a variety of doctrinal and practical reasons, they would not be
fully compensated if they sued a supplier for breach of contract.21
Under prevailing doctrines, buyers would have difficulty proving lost profits
with the requisite certainty. They might also be wary of seeking them because
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22 See Bernstein & Ben-Shahar (2000) (exploring the ways that concerns about information revelation
in discovery might affect a transactor’s incentive to sue). Counsel to a Large OEM confirmed that a
desire to avoid revealing sensitive firm information during discovery in general, and e-discovery in
particular, was one of the most important reasons her company avoided litigation. Interview with
Counsel to a Large OEM (December 2015).
23 Some of these switching costs, such as search costs and the costs of putting multiple potential
suppliers through their supplier qualification program until a suitable new partner is found,
would be relatively easy to quantify. Other potentially significant costs would not. These include
the increased coordination and monitoring costs associated with transacting with a new supplier as
well as the costs arising from the time it takes the buyer’s personnel to establish the types of
connections and understandings with the new supplier’s personnel that facilitate problem-solving.
Even more problematic from the perspective of a buyer is that in contexts where a buyer’s immediate
reaction to a termination would be to temporarily increase his purchases from an existing supplier, a
court would likely conclude that switching costs are negligible. However, these costs are, in practice,
quite significant. Buyers limit their buy from any one supplier for good reasons, see infra text
accompanying notes 90–95, and at some point in the future would therefore still have to bear the
costs of finding a new supplier.
24 The effects of different types of lawsuits, like patent disputes, on the likelihood that parties will
continue dealing is less clear.
25 Interview with Counsel to Large Midwestern OEM (December 2015).
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doing so would require them to reveal their profit margins which might, in
turn, damage their bargaining position in negotiations with other parts suppliers.22 It is also unlikely that courts would fully compensate buyers for the
switching costs associated with qualifying a new supplier23 or the potential
damage to their reputation resulting from use of a defective component that
causes downstream product malfunction.
Moreover, as a practical matter, the shadow cast by the right to receive money
damages (even fully compensatory damages) is far less powerful in these types
of long-term or repeat dealing exchanges than it is in discrete exchanges. In
these types of relationships, it is not unusual for the filing of a lawsuit for breach
of contract to be a relationship-ending event.24 As counsel to one OEM explained, “a supplier gets offended if you, the customer take him to court, it leads
to bad blood, he is going to be pissed off at you during the litigation as he is
incurring attorney’s fees and having his employees distracted, the distrust that
litigation creates just makes continued dealing impossible.”25
A buyer is, therefore, unlikely to sue for breach of contract (or have a credible
threat to sue) unless the amount he can recover (net of litigation costs, switching costs, secrecy costs, and reputation costs) exceeds the present value of the
marginal benefit of continuing to deal with this supplier, rather than the next
best supplier, in the future. Given that the size of each order tends to be small
relative to the value of the long-term relationship, suppliers realize that buyers
will rarely have a credible threat to sue them in the event of a breach unless the
buyer has concluded—perhaps because of a pattern of breaches over time, or
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26 A high-ranked manager at a large supplier explained that his company had no fear of being sued by
an OEM for a breach of contract so long as it was doing its best to fix any problems that had been
identified. He explained that in his many years working at the supplier he remembered no lawsuits
and that he could not imagine an OEM suing unless the supplier was doing something deliberately
opportunistic or acting like it simply did not care. Interview with Manager at Large Supplier
(December 2015).
27 Interview with Counsel to Large OEM (December 2015).
28 Interview with a High Ranking Strategic Sourcing Manager at a Large Mid-Western OEM (May
2014).
29 Interview with In-house Health Care Outsourcing Lawyer (July 2014). Even firms as prominent as
Apple Inc. are concerned about the way they are perceived by their suppliers. See infra text accompanying notes 145–146.
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the availability of a better supplier—that it is worthwhile to end the
relationship.26
Recognizing the effects of lawsuits on the prospect of future dealing suggests
that the shadow cast by the threat of court-imposed monetary sanctions on the
work-a-day actions of suppliers would likely be weak, even in the absence of
damage limitations. Over an important range of purchase order values, buyers
only have a credible threat to sue for breach of a contracting relationship, rather
than a mere breach of contract.
Yet, even when it is worthwhile to end a supply relationship, buyers prefer to
simply terminate the supplier and bear the loss rather than file a lawsuit. As counsel
to one OEM explained, as a buyer “you don’t want to get a reputation for suing
your suppliers, it will make all of them jittery, we will then be viewed with distrust,
others will negotiate for more protections, our world . . . is very small, word gets
around.”27 And, as a strategic sourcing manager at a large OEM explained,
“Contracts are not about lawsuits, they are about divorce. Sometimes we just
want out, making termination provisions the most important part of the deal.”28
Although buyers prefer termination to litigation, their termination decisions
are also tempered by both reputational and practical concerns. Buyers fear that
if they terminate suppliers too often or at the first sign of trouble, their existing
suppliers will be more reluctant to make relationship-specific investments and
putative suppliers will view them as less desirable contracting partners.29 Buyers
are also concerned that terminating even underperforming suppliers will
damage their reputation for treating their suppliers fairly. As a consequence,
even when they terminate for cause, buyers are careful to give suppliers enough
notice and enough transitional business to enable them to find other customers.
They also tend to compensate them for their reliance expenses even though this
is not contractually required.
OEM termination decisions are also influenced by the simple fact that it is
often cheaper to help a supplier fix its problems and improve its operations than
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30 NOE Respondent. Even in the auto industry where buyer-supplier relationships are notoriously
uncooperative, buyers often find it in their self-interest both to be flexible and to help their suppliers,
even at their own expense. See Whitford (2006, p. 65) (“The unwritten policy, seldom discussed
publicly by GM [a company with a very bad reputation, is] . . . that the automaker is prepared to help
some suppliers rather than risk part shortages . . . GM has hastened payments for parts, guaranteed
future contracts, postponed price cuts, offered consulting, and even raised the prices paid for
components . . . . The automakers do these things because they know it would be time consuming
and costly to replace certain parts makers.”).
31 This structure might be used as a way of ensuring that the buyer has little incentive to impose the fine
unless performance is truly nonconforming.
32 Interview with Procurement VP at Large Medical Machine OEM. See also Stuart et al. (1998, p. 85)
(noting that while Allen Bradley, a manufacturer of factory automation parts, adopted a plan to
penalize noncompliance with quality metrics by fining suppliers an amount equal to the cost of
remedying the defect, it ultimately decided to report, but not collect, the amount of the would-be
fine in an effort “to use the figures to foster awareness rather than to assess penalties”).
33 These suppliers tend to operate on a slim cash flow margin. Given that many buyers operate on the
basis of something close to just-in-time inventory practices, consequential damages (if not limited
by contract as they usually are) might lead all but the largest suppliers to file for bankruptcy.
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it is to bear the high cost of switching suppliers. As a mid-western OEM explained, “It takes a lot for a supplier to get in a position where we are going to resource their business. They almost have to make an effort . . . . Re-sourcing business . . . takes a lot of time, a lot of effort . . . . If we are noticing problems, we will
get some level of materials leadership involvement to see what the issues are.”30
Although OEMs are reluctant to sue or terminate suppliers, most MSAs contain a self-help damage remedy that enables buyers to obtain some monetary
compensation without ending a relationship. These remedy provisions (“interior
remedies”) typically permit a buyer to withhold payment and impose a small fine
when a nonconforming or late tender is made. The fine usually falls far short of
compensating the buyer for breach, but is often quite significant from the perspective of suppliers, many of whom operate on a slim (or leveraged) cash flow
margin.31 In practice, some firms impose these fines whenever delivery is nonconforming, while others only impose them after a problem occurs several times
or the supplier ignores a request to provide a plan to eliminate a documented
problem. As one procurement manager explained, her firm tended to impose
these fines only when the relationship with the supplier was deteriorating, or
when she wanted to get the attention of more senior managers who could see to it
that the underlying problem was corrected.32 As a consequence, the effect of these
fines on work-a-day behavior is likely to vary widely across firms.
In sum, a buyer’s threat to seek court-imposed damages for breach of contract is diluted by damage limitations, the structure of these transactions, and
the possibility that the supplier will be judgment proof.33 And, while the threat
of termination is nominally quite strong, its exercise is tempered by the high
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cost of switching suppliers as well as by buyers’ desire to maintain a reputation
for fairness. Legal remedies are also of limited value to most suppliers. They fear
that suing a customer would hurt their reputation. And, as one midsize supplier
aptly observed, “You get long-term agreements, but [they are of limited value
because] I can’t outspend them in court.”34
Together, these considerations suggest that the shadow of the law is not,
standing alone, strong enough to create sufficient incentives for suppliers to
meet their contractual commitments.

Against the background of the legal remedies available, OEM buyers, who tend
to operate on close to a just-in-time basis and whose production line relies on
hundreds of suppliers simultaneously meeting their obligations, are not content
to rely on mere promises to perform or the shadow effects of potential courtimposed monetary sanctions to induce the level of performance they require.
Rather, to increase the likelihood that their suppliers will perform as promised,
they have developed a variety of methods that either recreate or approximate
the core management techniques associated with intra-firm hierarchy.35
To ensure that products meet their quality specifications, OEMs go to
great lengths to regulate the production processes used in suppliers’ plants. In
some instances, they also exert influence over sub-suppliers’ plants.36 Most
OEMs require suppliers to operate their plants in conformity with the quality
and manufacturing standards set by the International Standards Organization,37
the Automotive Industry Action Group, or any of a number of other standard
setting groups. They also impose additional requirements that are designed to
better tailor these standards to their individual company’s particular needs.
John Deere, for example, requires its suppliers to operate their plants in compliance with the detailed quality and manufacturing process-related specifications

34 NOE Respondent.
35 See Stinchcombe (1990, p. 199) (setting out the five elements of “hierarchical intra-firm structure,”
namely “labor contracts, fiduciary relations, the exercised right to measure and reward performances, standard operating procedures and decision making and dispute resolving meetings,” four of
which (fiduciary relations excepted) are recreated in OEM-supplier outsourcing agreements).
36 Some buyers confine their oversight to first-tier suppliers. Others put restrictions on which firms
their first-tier supplier may buy from and require all sub-suppliers to comply with many of the
requirements they impose on their tier-one suppliers. In general, the tier-one suppliers are responsible for monitoring their sub-suppliers and ensuring that they comply with these requirements.
Some buyers require both suppliers and their sub-suppliers to agree to be audited by the buyer at any
time. See Ingersoll (2014, p. 5 “Quality”).
37 See, e.g., International Standards Organization, ISO 9001.
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38 The quality manual in turn explicitly incorporates the John Deere Supplier Code of Conduct, Deere
(2015), John Deere Standards, and the John Deere Restricted Materials List. See also: Navistar (2013)
(a twenty-nine-page manual covering most of the same subjects as the Deere manual); Ingersoll
(2014) (same); Kohler, Global Supplier Quality Manual, http://www.kohler.com/corp/supplier/
SQM_GPI_3009_Rev1_1_2008.pdf (covering the same subjects as the Deere manual but in somewhat less detail). It is important to note that while the requirements of these manuals are onerous,
many of their provisions are simply company-specific refinements of ISO standards. A Deere manager estimated that 80 percent of the Deere requirements could be categorized this way. Interview
with Senior Supply Chain Manager of Large OEM (April 15, 2014).
39 Deere QM (2009, Sec. 24, “Process Control Methods”).
40 Deere QM (2009, Sec. 25, “Suggested Quality Tools”).
41 Deere QM (2009, Sec. 5.6.1) (“Management Review - General”).
42 For example, before a new part is produced, a “Design, Process and Assembly Review” must be held.
This review includes “a meeting which confirms all expectations of the product or services prior to a
physical build. John Deere teams initiate this review as early as possible before tooling release.” Deere
QM (2009, Sec. 7.2.1, “Determination of Requirements Related to the Product”). Similar meetings
must also be held when there are significant changes to existing products. And, when the quality of
the product to be produced “cannot be verified by subsequent monitoring or measurement,” the
supplier must submit a verification warrant validating the “qualification of processes, qualification
of equipment and personnel, and use of defined methodologies and procedures, requests for records
and re-validation,” after which John Deere reviews the submission and approves or rejects the
verification warrant. (Sec. 7.5.2, “Validation of Processes for Production and Service Provision”).
43 For example, the SQIE is also given the authority to: designate various engineering standards as “key
characteristics” for the purposes of Six Sigma, Cummins (2010, Sec. E(6)(d)); require a supplier to
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set out in the eighty-eight-page John Deere Quality Manual.38 Among other
things the Manual sets forth: nine approved process control methods;39 twentyfive approved quality control tools that can each be used at different stages of the
production process;40 numerous Deere-approved production standards; a requirement that the supplier train internal auditors who understand Deere’s requirements;41 and the requirements for participating in Deere’s structured process
for the development and introduction of new products consisting of six phases
and twenty-one carefully delineated milestones. The manual also specifies many
points in the production process where Deere personnel must sign off before the
supplier is permitted to move on to the next stage.42 Together the requirements of
Deere’s Supplier Quality Manual are so extensive that they amount to Deere
dictating the standard operating procedures to be used at its suppliers’ plants—
procedures that are generally considered a feature of intra-firm hierarchy.
Similarly, Cummins too imposes detailed standard operating procedures on
its suppliers. It also goes a step further and appoints one of its own employees,
dubbed a supplier quality improvement engineer (SQIE), to both manage and
oversee production at each of its suppliers’ plants. The SQIE is given broad
ranging authority over the way the supplier runs its production line and the
types of quality control methods it is required to use.43 Almost any change the
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participate in Cummins-developed quality programs, (Sec. 8.5); designate the number of samples
required for various types of approvals, (Sec. L(3)(d)); require the use of “statistical tools for
managing and improving processes “(Sec. 8.6); require the supplier to keep particular types of
records (Sec. N(2)); “check the suppliers’ actions,” taken as part of an audit (Sec. M(2)(b));
waive certain paperwork requirements, (Sec. Q(2)); and set time frames for suppliers to take particular actions related to product development and introduction.
44 Among other things, the SQIE must approve: any change in the supplier’s supply base (or even the
plant the supplier buys from), Cummins (2010, Sec. N(1)(c)); any change in production processes,
(Sec. N(1)(b)); and the processes a supplier proposes to use to complete a rework order after defects
in deliverables has been discovered. (Sec. M(1)).
45 Cummins (2010, Sec. E(24)) (“No new or changed parts can be shipped to Cummins,” unless the
methods used to produce them have been “approved by a Cummins SQIE.”).
46 Cummins (2010, Sec. G(9)).
47 Cummins (2010, Sec. I9) (“It is impossible to cover every conceivable situation with a blanket
statement or definition. If a situation occurs that is not covered by the Cummins Supplier
Handbook, the Cummins SQIE is the point of contact for getting questions answered and situations
resolved.”).
48 See Tadelis & Williamson (2013) (describing the functional attributes of intra-firm hierarchy that
give “make” an advantage over “buy”).
49 See Ingersoll (2014, Sec. 2.1 “Training”) (requiring their suppliers to describe the skill sets needed by
their manufacturing personnel and to provide documentation that all employees working on the
production-line have been trained to these standards).
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supplier might want to make in its sourcing or operations,44 as well as the
methods used to produce any new products, must be approved by the
SQIE.45 The SQIE also has the authority to request “data above & beyond the
stated requirements in the . . . Handbook if it is deemed pertinent to protect the
interests of Cummins,”46 and is given broad ranging discretion to deal with
situations that are not covered in the Supplier Handbook.47
The broad discretion vested in the SQIE and the authority he has to
administratively deal with needed changes, are just the “strong” types of “administrative control[s]” that are well-suited to tasks involving a need for
“coordinated adaptation,” and that are typically viewed as hallmarks of the
types of hierarchical management techniques traditionally associated with
intra-firm production.48
Another core type of control associated with intra-firm production governed
by hierarchy is control over labor, and with it the ability to reward good performance. OEMs seek to exercise control and oversight over their suppliers’
labor force in many ways. For example, they require particular supplier employees to participate in buyer- (or in some instances supplier-) run training
programs49 and have buyer personnel (like the Cummins SQIE) present at the
supplier’s plant to oversee operations and decide what changes are permissible.
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50 Deere QM (2009, Sec. 6.2, “Human Resources”) (“A supplier shall provide a system of ongoing
monitoring of each employee’s education, training and work experience and provide opportunities
for training and continuing education to improve employee’s skill level . . . . The training shall
provide employees with an awareness of the relevance and importance of their activities and how
they contribute to the achievement of quality objectives in the business plan. John Deere classes for
Supplier Quality Manual, John Deere Standards, and Enterprise Product Delivery Process Supply
Chain Integration are available”). Similarly, Honda-US’s involvement in, and oversight of, its core
suppliers’ operations includes many functions that closely resemble hierarchy. Honda “reviews the
supplier’s sales, overall financial situation, annual business plans, technology development, and
investment plans, and . . . reviews measures such as employee turnover, working conditions, safety
issues, absenteeism, management attitude and their use of temporary manpower.” See Choi & Hong
(2002, p. 477).
51 Interview with Outsourcing Lawyer (November 2014). See also Overby (2009) (recommending, in
the context of IT outsourcing, that when “cash incentives are paid, ask the supplier to pay a large
portion of the money to staff assigned to the customer’s account . . . this helps to attract and retain
the supplier’s best people on the customer’s account”). In addition, MSAs frequently have provisions requiring disputes that cannot be resolved by lower level managers to be discussed at progressively higher levels of both the OEM and the supplier’s organizations before being submitted to
litigation—a practice that echoes intra-firm dispute resolution procedures (see, e.g., Deere and
Stanadyne Agreement, supra note 15 at Sec. XXII(6)(1)).
52 Interview with Counsel to Large OEM (December 2015).
53 As one manager at a large supplier explained, firms like Deere spend a lot of time at the plants of new
suppliers. As time passes, if quality is constantly good, they will generally lessen their involvement.
However, they will still make plant visits on at least a monthly basis and will step up their involvement if the supplier scorecard reveals problems. Interview with Large Supplier (December 15, 2015).
See also Osram Sylvania, Global Automotive Lighting: Supplier Handbook, https://assets.sylvania.
com/assets/Documents/Supplier%20Handbook.5a5ab44b-f983-49a7-b12e-0cc68a32596c.pdf at 15
(describing how firms move from “Material Inspection Department Quarantine” status, where
incoming product is extensively tested, to “ship to stock” status where it is not); National
Instruments, NI Supplier Handbook, http://www.ni.com/company/suppliers/supplierhandbook.
htm at 9 (describing their Dock-to-Stock Program).
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They also dictate aspects of their suppliers’ HR policies.50 In the past, buyers
attempted to assert even more control over suppliers’ labor force by dictating
the bonus to be paid to production managers and workers if certain targets were
met.51 However, a Department of Labor ruling led lawyers to advise against this
practice, so it was dropped. Nevertheless, many MSAs include provisions specifying by name the supplier’s employees who will be involved in overseeing the
contract. They also include processes for choosing replacements if these employees leave the supplier’s employ.
Not every OEM engages in such extensive participation in and oversight of
their suppliers’ operations. Some buyers reserve this scrutiny for their suppliers
of complex or critical parts.52 Others engage in intense intervention and oversight, either at the beginning of a contracting relationship or when a new
product is introduced but lessen their engagement as the relationship
develops.53
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3. FACILITATING THE EMERGENCE OF COOPERATIVE
CONTRACTING RELATIONSHIPS

Large industrial buyers have created a variety of contract administrative mechanisms and other institutional structures that make it possible for cooperative
contracting relationships—that is, relationships where shirking is minimized,
relationship-specific investments are adequately bonded, and opportunistic behavior is adequately controlled—to arise and endure largely outside of the
shadow of law. The most important such mechanisms are described below.
3.1. Preconditions for Cooperation to Emerge

In order for cooperation to emerge, both the buyer and the supplier must decide
to cooperate at the outset of their contracting relationship, and each must also
believe (or behave as if it believes) that that the other will do the same. Thereafter,
they must each respond to cooperation with cooperation, and defection, or a
certain number of defections, with either defection or gradated defection.
A buyer and supplier’s initial expectation that their contracting partner will
cooperate is created in part by buyer-administered supplier qualification
54 See Macaulay (1963) (quoting interviews that reflect the informality and flexibility of day-to-day
contracting behavior and the desire of businessmen to keep lawyers and references to “the contract”
out of their transactions).
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Nevertheless, while OEMs differ in terms of their oversight of manufacturing
and the degree to which their contracting practices incorporate hierarchy-type
governance techniques, the core point is that OEM buyers, many of whom operate on a just-in-time inventory basis, do not simply contract, wait for delivery,
accept or reject, and then sue if cure is not forthcoming. Rather, they interact with
their suppliers throughout the production, delivery, and quality assessment process to try and catch problems sooner rather than later and work together to solve
problems rather than threatening one another with lawsuits. It is in this respect
that many of the work-a-day practices in the manufacturing world today echo the
findings of Stewart Macaulay’s seminal study,54 only with a subtle difference:
these collaborative relational interactions may look informal, but in reality they
are shaped and supported by the provisions of highly formal written agreements,
agreed allocations of discretionary authority, and an array of formal contract
administration mechanisms. The core contract provisions and contract administration mechanisms that together with the force of network governance, enable
these seemingly informal and highly cooperative contracting relationships to
emerge are discussed further below.
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55 For a summary of one such program, see Cummins (2010, Sec. I “Supplier Selection”).
56 Interview with Counsel to a Large OEM (December 1, 2015); Interview with Supply Chain Manager
at Medical Machinery Corporation (December 2014).
57 See, e.g., Hewlett Packard, Supply Chain Responsibility: Our Approach, http://h20195.www2.hp.com/
V2/GetPDF.aspx/c03742930.pdf at 4 (“[I]nsight from . . . press articles . . . may also affect our assessments of supplier risk); Interview with Supply Chain VP from a Large Health Care Machine
Company (July 2013) (noting that before doing business with a supplier she would check it out
with her contacts in other firms the supplier dealt with as well as with other individuals she knew in
the supplier’s local area).
58 Fichman & Levinthal (1991) (suggesting that “favorable prior beliefs, trust, goodwill, financial
resources or psychological commitment,” give rise to an “initial stock of assets,” that create a
honeymoon period, (defined as a “suspension of the threat of a relationship ending,”) at the
outset of commercial relationships, but providing limited empirical support from business settings,
outside of one study that found such a period to exist at the outset of auditor–client relationships
but that needs to be viewed with caution as the negative market signal sent by firms who change their
auditors early in a relationship might well account for the effect).
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programs.55 These programs require potential suppliers to provide: detailed financial information; information about the identity of their other contracting
partners and the percentage of their output they sell to each; contact information
for both current and past customers;56 and documentation that their quality
control systems comply with international standards. Buyers also conduct thorough inspections of suppliers’ plants and interview both managerial and production-line level employees. In addition to these formal information channels,
procurement managers often investigate potential suppliers through their more
informal business contacts, through their own employees who may have worked
at or with particular suppliers in the past, and through the web and business
press.57
Supplier qualification programs are costly for a buyer to administer and
expensive for a putative supplier to complete. Once the supplier has been
qualified and the firms begin to transact, both firms will be acutely aware
that if either decides to exit the relationship, they will lose this investment
and both will also face significant switching costs. As a consequence, both
firms are likely to begin the relationship by cooperating and to assume that
their contracting partner will do the same.58 To strengthen this expectation, at
the start of a new relationship, buyers typically place small purchase orders,
slowly increasing the order size if performance is up to their expectations. Given
this, in the early stages of their relationship, it is unlikely that either transactor
would obtain a large enough payoff from defecting to make it desirable to incur
the associated costs. Each party is, therefore, likely to begin early production
rounds by cooperating.
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3.2 Conditions for Maintaining Cooperation

3.2.1 Reducing the Risk of Misunderstanding

Large buyers take many steps to reduce the likelihood that suppliers will misunderstand either their contract requirements or their unwritten expectations. John
Deere’s supplier portal, for example, includes webinars and PowerPoint presentations that explain the requirements of its quality manual and highlight the
“critical” requirements that, if violated, will “put the supplier at the highest
risk of violating the Purchase Order Terms and Conditions.”60 Caterpillar runs
a Supplier Development College, which offers a variety of on-boarding classes for
new suppliers designed to increase their understanding of Caterpillar’s contract

59 Bernstein has explored the role played by clear contracts, institutional efforts to promote common
knowledge, and the availability of formalist adjudicators whose decisions are predictable in sustaining cooperation in the shadow of the cotton industry’s well-developed private legal system, see
Bernstein (2001). Similarly, Bozovic & Hadfield (2015) recognize that written contracts can support,
or in their terms “scaffold” cooperation even when they are rarely (and are rarely expected to be)
legally enforced. However, in their account (unlike the one presented here) both lawyers and the
content of contract law play a central role in enabling the written agreement to scaffold cooperative
exchange. As they explain, cooperation can be achieved because “a distinctive body of contract law
and practice [that includes “formal legal doctrine” as well as the “norms and rules of contract
analysis”] coordinates the interpretation of ambiguous and multi-dimensional events by the parties
to a contractual relationship,” thereby enabling “those events to be classified in a binary fashion as
‘breach’ or ‘not breach,’” and reducing the “variance associated with the estimates of the likelihood
that contracting events will be classified as breach or not” (p. 5).
60 Deere QM (2009, p. 3). Other buyers produce manuals to enhance suppliers’ understanding of their
contract requirements. See, e.g., GE Energy Supplier Quality Resource Book (March 2006) (providing
an accessible overview of GE’s quality requirements but warning that it “is not a substitute for a
rigorous contract and document review by the supplier as part of the process to fulfill an order”).
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Once a cooperative contracting relationship has been established, it is most
likely to endure if the transactors have a common understanding of what constitutes cooperation and are able to reliably distinguish acts of cooperation from
acts of defection. The biggest threat to continued cooperation is the possibility
that a transactor will misclassify an act of cooperation as an act of defection and
thus set off a series of actions and reactions that lead to the disintegration of the
contracting relationship.59 Given the detail in these contracts and the fact that
buyers expect strict compliance regarding quality, on time delivery, and a host
of logistics-related requirements, the potential for relationships to unravel due
to either a supplier’s misunderstanding of a buyer’s needs or a buyer’s mistaken
classification of operational outcomes is omnipresent; yet, buyers have developed ways to reduce both of these risks and moderate their responses to
bad outcomes in ways that are designed to facilitate continued cooperation
without opening the door to opportunism.
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61 Courses offered include “Supplier Expectations Workshop” and “Understanding Purchase Order
Terms and Conditions.”
62 See, e.g., Supplier Development College, https://supplierconnect.cat.com/wps/portal/catconnect/
SDC (describing on-boarding classes for new suppliers that teach them how to do business with
Caterpillar; courses on aspects of manufacturing ranging from asbestos control to lead to crane
safety; and a class on “Meeting Customer Expectations.” Similarly, John Deere provides “classes for
the Supplier Quality Manual, John Deere Standards, and Enterprise Product Delivery Process and
Supply Chain Integration.” See Deere QM (2009, Sec. 6.2, “Human Resources”). See also Navistar
(2013) (noting that a training module is available online for each stage in the Supplier Quality Life
Cycle Management requirements and that managers are required to complete them).
63 Navistar (2013, Sec. 3.3) (“Suppliers must ensure that Navistar requirements are defined and understood prior to acceptance of business . . . and return the Supplier Quotation Feasibility Commitment
to confirm understanding of Navistar requirements. When an aspect of requirements is not understood or agreed, suppliers must provide a written request for explanation of the unclear points to the
appropriate Navistar Engineer, the supporting Navistar Supplier Quality Representative, and
Navistar Procurement Representative. If no questions are raised, Navistar assumes that suppliers
understand the requirements and will adhere to them.”).
64 Lisboa & Osborne (2014). Navistar also produces webinars explaining its quality manual and requires its suppliers to complete them. See http://www.navistarsupplier.com/IntegratedSupplier
Quality/QualityDocuments.aspx.
65 ManagementParadise.com, Supply Chain Management of Harley Davidson (January 8, 2011), http://
www.managementparadise.com/forums/elements-logistics/212454-supply-chain-managementharley-davidson-inc.html.
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requirements and unwritten expectations.61 Suppliers are also encouraged to
improve their operations by attending Caterpillar University which offers courses
on the latest industrial techniques, regulatory requirements, and quality control
methods.62 Navistar takes a somewhat different approach. It requires its suppliers
to confirm in writing that they understand all Navistar specifications before
accepting any business.63 It also mandates that its suppliers’ key personnel participate in various web-based training programs, among them a program designed to “take our quality expectations beyond statements of expectation to
training in the important aspects of quality that will deliver to our expectations.”64 Harley too has “a large variety of training types for [its] suppliers,”
including “a highly formalized methodology for instructing suppliers that can last
up to three months,” as well as “training for the Master Supply Agreement[].”65
Although these formal channels for conveying information are important,
suppliers also come to understand their buyers’ needs and expectations through
the manager-led process of negotiating product specifications and the provisions of Service Level Agreements and/or Statements of Work, including the key
performance indicators that will be used to assess performance. The information learned in these negotiating sessions about the culture and expectations of
each company is viewed by many transactors as being important to the
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successful conduct and governance of these relationships. Some consider it to
be even more important than the final written agreements.66
3.2.2 Reducing the Risk of Misclassification

66 See, e.g., Karten (2003) (“A properly established SLA fosters improved communication between the
two parties . . . the very process of establishing an SLA helps to strengthen communication, so that
the parties come to better understand each others’ needs, priorities, and concerns.”).
67 See, e.g., National Instruments’ Supplier Scorecard Assessment Criteria (2011) (defining the allocation of points on the NI supplier scorecard and indicating that the only subjective element, the
score for “customer service and support,” was allocated only 10 out of 100 points.”).
68 Milligan & Carbone (2000, p. 65) (stating that, according to Harley, “[i]f a supplier receives a bad
report card, Harley-Davidson takes action. If the Supplier is not doing well, we send resources in to
help him.”).
69 See Richard Menhorn, NCR: Supplier Scorecard Procedure (June 25, 2010), http://www.ncr.com/
wp-content/uploads/ncr-supplier-scorecard-process.doc (describing the operation of the NCR
company’s scorecard).
70 In firms that are multi-sourced, these scorecards give the buyer an inexpensive way to benchmark
suppliers’ performance against one another.
71 The prospect of these nonlegal rewards like increased business or a public announcement of partner-level status that the buyer can use to solicit business (an action that would otherwise be forbidden under the terms of most master agreements), play an important role alongside nonlegal
sanctions in supporting these agreements—most notably in creating incentives for more than mere
compliance with contract provisions.
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Buyers have also created a formal contract administration mechanism, the
Supplier Scorecard, to rate each supplier in terms of their compliance with
relatively objective performance metrics as well as the buyer’s assessment of
the quality of the contracting relationship more generally.67 The core metrics
that make up the bulk of most scorecards are on-time performance, cost, quality, and customer service. The buyer uses these metrics to create a quarterly
composite score, which it then uses to determine the business opportunities (if
any) that it will make available to the supplier in the next quarter.
By rating on a quarterly rather than purchase-order-by-purchase-order
basis, buyers are less likely to overreact to isolated bad outcomes. Under the
scorecard system, the highest-rated suppliers are eligible for new business.
Those with adequate ratings keep their existing levels of business but are expected
to improve. And suppliers with lower ratings are warned that their order quantities will decrease if improvements are not quickly made. Many buyers accompany these warnings with consulting services designed to improve their
operation.68 It is only after a few rounds of low ratings that suppliers are terminated.69 Among other things,70 this mechanism enables buyers to reward suppliers for their performance by allocating them increased business.71 It also
enables them to impose carefully graduated monetary sanctions on them for
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72 These “sanctions” are very costly to the seller and do not benefit the buyer (and are in fact costly for
it to impose), so they are best understood as a form of decoupled damages. See Polinsky & Che
(1991, p. 562) (“The optimal system of decoupling makes the defendant’s payment as high as
possible. Such a policy allows the award to the plaintiff to be lowered, thereby reducing the plaintiff’s
incentive to sue—and hence litigation costs—without sacrificing the defendant’s incentive to exercise care.”).
73 In addition, in contexts where the buyer multi-sources the good, the scorecard creates a tournament
among the suppliers, and puts them in a prisoner’s dilemma vis-à-vis the revelation of some types of
information. For example, when a supplier knows that the buyer can compare his statements about
the lowest achievable error rate with those of other producers, he is more likely to be truthful.
74 See, e.g., John Deere, Achieving Excellence: A Strategy for World-Class Supplier Relationships, (n.d.),
https://jdsupply.deere.com/apps/ae/docs/brochure_inserts/english/english_brochure.pdf at 4.
75 Sloan Global Supplier Quality Manual, https://www.sloanvalve.com/GQA_SUPPLIER_MANUAL_
7-2013_(Rev_6).pdf (7-2013 Rev. 6, 2013), p. 4 (noting that “‘certified’ suppliers get ‘dock-to-stock’
status . . . [and are] exempt from the receiving inspection process at Sloan facilities”).
76 At the Ariens Corporation, for example, certified suppliers receive “preferential treatment from the
OEM . . . . While [they] are expected to come up with cost saving ideas, they enjoy partnership style
relationships with Ariens, particularly in engineering. In bidding, if they can come within five
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nonperformance without having to end the contracting relationship to do so.
These sanctions do not benefit the buyer,72 and may be costly for him to
impose because he will have to secure other sources of supply to cover reduced
quantities. He is, therefore, unlikely to impose them unless the supplier has
actually underperformed.73
OEMs and suppliers meet quarterly to discuss the scorecard. Buyers share their
perspective on the scorecard and suppliers are encouraged to ask questions, dispute various ratings, and describe their plans to improve in critical areas. These
discussions increase transparency. They make it less likely that a supplier will
respond with a defection of its own if the buyer makes an errant judgment about
the quality of its performance. Even if the supplier ultimately disagrees with the
buyer’s assessments and explanations, it is nonetheless much less likely to conclude that its scorecard rating (provided the buyer provides a plausible rationale)
is an independent defection on the part of the buyer. The scorecard, together with
the quarterly business review, serves as a useful, though far from foolproof, way of
heading off a mistaken series of echoing defections that has the potential to lead
to the deterioration or end of an otherwise beneficial contracting relationship.
The incentives created by the scorecard are reinforced by buyers’ practice of
granting status designations, like “partner-level”74 or “certified” supplier to
those suppliers who continue to meet or exceed specified performance criteria.
Some of these designations come with valuable benefits, such as better or more
extensive information sharing, more frequent contact, dock-to-stock status,75
and the award of new business even when they are not the lowest bidder so long
as they are within a specified range of the lowest bidder.76 In addition, it is not
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percent of the lowest bid, they get the order.” See Rickert et al. (2000, p. 17). See also Aberdeen
Group, The Supplier Performance Measurement Benchmarking Report, http://www.lyonsinfo.com/_
resources/aberdeen_spms_report.pdf (Dec. 2002) (noting that “enterprises often give new business
proposals (i.e., “bids”) from preferred suppliers additional weight, allowing preferred suppliers to
win new business without necessarily being the lowest priced offer.”).
77 See, e.g., Supplier Questionnaire for Ceredyne Corp., http://www.ceradyne.com/uploads/supplierdocs/
662011102210AMSupplier%20Questionnaire.pdf, p. 4 (asking prospective suppliers “is your facility a
certified supplier for any other customer . . . if yes please provide customer name if possible.”).
78 Despite widespread coverage in the press, empirical evidence on the effect on suppliers’ businesses of
winning these awards is conflicting. Compare Hendricks & Singhal (1996) (looking solely at buyer
quality focused awards given to public companies and finding no abnormal returns on the day after
the announcement) and Hendricks & Singhal (2001) (using a different methodology and finding
that winning a buyer-granted quality award resulted in a 28.24 percent “mean percent change in
operating income.”). See also Azadegan & Pai (2008) (concluding, based on data from the semi-conductor sector, that buyer-given “awards are an indicator of long-term supplier performance,” and
that “operational awards show direct association with ROE, [while] product awards show direct
association with sales growth.”).
79 Interview with Supply Chain VP from a Large Health Care Machine Company (July 2013) (explaining that while not determinative in the selection of a new supplier, she would sometimes give the
receipt of these awards some weight); Interview with Deere Supply Chain Manager (same).
80 See, e.g., Supply Agreement between John Deere & Titan Tire Company, (April 15, 2011) at Cl. 22
(“[N]o press release, public announcement, confirmation, or other information regarding supply
orders for the Products under this Agreement, or the fact that negotiations for new products or
increased quantities for existing order are occurring, will be made by Titan without the prior written
approval of Deere or by Deere without the prior written approval of Titan.”) See also Supply
Contract between Phoenix Technologies Ltd. & Intel Corp. (December 18, 1995, Sec. 8.2) (providing
for similar confidentiality).
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uncommon for supplier qualification questionnaires to ask if the supplier is a
“certified” supplier to any of its customers,77 which suggests that obtaining
certified status may be a valuable business asset.
To ensure that suppliers who reach the highest status category have an
incentive to maintain high-level performance, firms have created supplier-ofthe-year awards. These awards are covered in the business press78 and are
considered an indication of quality by other buyers when they are selecting
suppliers.79 By announcing the award publicly, the buyer confers a benefit on
the supplier. The supplier can then use the award to solicit other business,
something that it might otherwise be prohibited from doing. The confidentiality provisions in MSAs often forbid suppliers from disclosing even the existence of a contracting relationship without the buyer’s consent.80 Sometimes the
mere fact that a supplier sells to Deere is an important business asset as other
putative buyers will know that the supplier has learned to run an efficient plant
by virtue of Deere’s oversight and assistance.
Buyers also obtain a prospective benefit from these status designations and
awards. Once it is announced that a supplier has reached partner status or is the
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81 See Deere QM (2009, Sec. 8.2.2, “Internal Audit”) (“Deere reserves the right to conduct a quality
system assessment at the suppliers’ facility . . . . Deere would expect access to a supplier’s personnel,
documentation, . . . and test facilities”); see also Primary Contract Manufacturing Agreement between
JDS Uniphase and Fabrinet (January 1, 2008, Sec. 10.1) (setting out broad inspection and quality
control rights as well as requiring “reasonable access to its staff including technical staff, to determine the identity and scope of Improvements and New Technology whether solely or jointly developed by Supplier, which JDSU reasonably believes Supplier has not adequately disclosed in
accordance with this Agreement”).
82 See, e.g., Deere QM (2009, Sec. 4.2.4, “Control of Records”) (“[A]ll quality records” including but
not limited to twenty five enumerated types, must be “readily accessible upon request by a John
Deere representative.”).
83 See, e.g., Fuel Supply Agreement between Petro Truckstops and Petro Stopping Centers (March 9, 2007,
Sec. 3) (“Each party shall . . . maintain and make . . . books and records available for at least two (2)
years after the termination of this Agreement for possible inspection, copying, extracting and/or audit
by the other party. Each party . . . shall have the right not more than once every six calendar months to
review and, through an independent certified public accounting firm . . . conduct audits with respect to
the books, records, and all other documents and materials in the possession or under the control of the
other party relating to this Agreement.”). More generally, these provisions give buyers the right to get
almost all of the information they would get through civil discovery without having to file a lawsuit.
84 See, e.g., NOE Respondent (explaining, when asked if they give up their costing information to their
largest OEM buyers, “somewhat, we take our material . . . then we just have a dinosaur way of doing
labor costs . . . we don’t break it down. The upshot is that [the OEM] can’t see the margins”); NOE
Respondent (explaining that when they were compelled to give their costing data to a large OEM,
“we’ve done it to such an extent that they had an extremely hard time understanding it,” and noting
this was a deliberate tactic). NOE Respondent (explaining that while the overall margins they reveal
across all parts they make for a buyer are roughly accurate, the data related to a particular product
are less accurate to avoid push back from buyers).
85 See, e.g., Harley Davidson (2003, “Late Delivery Module”) (providing that a supplier who delivers
late will not be liable for any “of H-D’s incidental, special or consequential damages (such as lost
profits) in connection with a product delivery delay,” so long as “(1) Supplier’s delay in delivering . . . is not the result of an intentional breach of this Agreement by Supplier and (2) upon
recognizing that it will or probably will be unable to deliver . . . . Supplier promptly informs H-D
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Supplier of the Year, a supplier who fails to win similar accolades in future years
will suffer reputational harm. Knowing this, suppliers who win these coveted
designations have an incentive to continue to perform at a high level in the future.
The MSAs also have provisions designed to improve the accuracy of the buyer’s
assessment of the supplier’s performance and to enable the buyer to better understand the causes of any nonperformance. They give buyers the right to: inspect the
supplier’s plant with or without notice, review and audit its quality control systems81 and quality control reports,82 and audit its books and/or other records.83
While books and records are always subject to manipulation,84 these provisions
nevertheless give buyers important (albeit not perfect) information that they can
use to more accurately determine if, and in some instances why, sellers are violating certain types of contract provisions.
OEMs care deeply about the reasons for poor quality, late delivery, or any other
type of subpar performance. The reason for a breach influences their response.85
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and promptly and continuously uses its best efforts to deliver all late Products as quickly as
possible.”).
86 As one OEM explained, even when there are “big problems,” his firm’s “philosophy is to work with
them [the supplier] to fix the problem. Obviously if they can’t fix it over some period of time or it
continues to be one that comes back. Then the partnership we thought we had, we don’t have
anymore so we have to find another option.” NOE Respondent.
87 Rooney & Vanden Heuvel (2004).
88 Rooney & Vanden Heuvel (2004). Supplier Qualification questionnaires used during the supplier
qualification process sometimes ask whether the supplier has established root cause analysis procedures. See, e.g., AAF International Supplier Questionnaire, Rev. 6/00, http://www.aaflatinoamerica.com/
aafintl/supplier%20questionnaire%20pdf.ashx.pdf. In addition, some buyers reserve the right to be
present during and participate in the conduct of the root cause analysis. See, e.g., Carlisle (2013, p. 22).
89 The provisions are necessary because even in contexts where it is likely to be in the supplier’s interest
to reveal this information, in the absence of these provisions the information would likely remain
private. The individual employee who would have to release the information as well as the lawyer
who would likely have to sign off on its release would face tremendous personal “second guess risk”
from authorizing the release of this information, and therefore would be unlikely to do so. However,
when these types of provisions are included they remove the second guess risk associated with
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Breaches due to one-off manufacturing glitches are largely ignored, unless they are
frequent. Breaches due to systematic production problems (even large ones) that
the buyer thinks can be remedied are initially met with offers of technical assistance,86 sometimes at the buyer’s expense. And opportunistic breaches or breaches
caused by operational difficulties that cannot be remedied are typically met with
the harshest responses, including termination for cause.
To enable buyers to determine the causes of a particular breach, most contracts
give them the right to demand a “root cause analysis,” when a problem arises. A
root cause analysis is “a tool designed to help identify not only what and how an
event occurred, but also why it happened.”87 A properly conducted root cause
analysis should also be able to determine whether the type of process problems
that caused the undesirable outcome are amenable “to specif[ic] workable corrective measures that [will] prevent future events of the type observed.”88
Together, these audit/oversight and root cause provisions reduce the likelihood that a buyer will mistakenly classify a one-off industrial mishap as defection
and thus set off a chain of reactions that either terminate or severely damage the
parties’ relationship. They also make it possible for these contract provisions to
condition on information that in their absence would not be observable and
would only be verifiable through the filing of a lawsuit and the conduct of civil
discovery. As a consequence, these provisions both expand the range of commitments that can be extralegally enforced and significantly reduce the likelihood of
a buyer filing suit or terminating a supplier based only on his best guess of what
civil discovery would reveal.89 Together with buyers’ inclination to assist
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revealing the information. For a comprehensive discussion of the ways that second guess risk affects
lawyers, see Bernstein (2001).
90 OEMs expect suppliers to cut costs each year. Some MSAs state the percentage reduction expected,
others are silent.
91 For the twelve OEMs in the NOE Study, information about the percentage of their largest suppliers’
revenue that their contracts amounted to was available for eight of them. For the companies that
follow, the percentage of the three publicly traded suppliers with the largest percentage of revenue
related to the OEM contract is given in parenthesis: Navistar (33%, 16%, 6.2%); Arvin Meritor
(99.11%, 16%, 1.2%); Ingersoll-Rand (10.5%, 5.1%, 3.1%); John Deere Horicon (14%, 13%, 6.2%);
Harley Davidson (12%, 2.2%, 1.58%); Osh-Kosh (8%, 4.4%); Kohler (24.08, 10%); CNH (.15%,
.10%). Whitford (2006). These measure look only at the percentage of output of tier-one suppliers.
They do not capture any larger dependency that a tier-two approved supplier may have by virtue of
supplying more than one of a particular buyer’s tier-one suppliers.
92 Interview with Supply Chain VP from a Large Health Care Machine Company (July 2013).
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suppliers in solving production problems before sanctioning them, these provisions add a measure of stability to these contracting relationships.
The contract administration mechanisms described here are very effective in
creating and sustaining cooperation; yet, they require suppliers to disclose a
great deal of information and place few constraints on buyers. As a consequence, even after contract provisions and contract administration mechanisms
have done their work, buyers remain able to take advantage of suppliers once
contractual relationships have begun. Among other things, they can press for
costly changes to production processes, demand price reductions (other than
those that are required or contemplated as part of the contract),90 and/or deviate from the expected order quantity. In addition, as discussed further below,
as these relationships move from make-to-spec to more complex relationships
where suppliers take responsibility for design, co-design or aspects of sub-assembly, numerous other risks either emerge or become more salient, leaving
suppliers (and in certain circumstances buyers) quite vulnerable.
Given that suppliers are aware of the buyers’ opportunity to engage in hold-up
or other types of opportunism, buyers who do not intend to behave opportunistically would be better off if they could credibly bind themselves not to do so.
One way that buyers attempt to limit the price they pay for the hold-up risk that
cannot be eliminated by contract is to limit the amount of the harm they can
inflict on a supplier. This in turn strengthens the supplier’s ability to resist the
buyer’s opportunistic demands. Buyers do this by refusing to contract if the
amount they anticipate wanting to purchase is more than 20–30 percent of the
supplier’s revenue.91 As a purchasing manager of a large medical machine, OEM
explained, her firm sometimes experienced large changes in the downstream
demand for its products and wanted to be able to vary its buy when this occurred
or when one of their suppliers got a lower scorecard rating.92 However, the firm
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93 One large OEM confirmed that they wanted their suppliers to sell to many others so that “they will
remain healthy,” even when demand goes down. It explained that if a supplier offered to deal
exclusively with them they would say “that is a bad idea. We would like to be a substantial customer
to you, but we don’t want you to be dependent on us.” NOE Respondent. Similarly, another OEM
when asked whether he wanted his suppliers to diversify their customer base said, “Yes from a
technology standpoint, from a supplier health standpoint . . . our goal is to be with the best suppliers
in terms of quality and tech, we encourage our suppliers to work with others, we have suppliers that
work with our competitors, but we manage it.” NOE Respondent.
94 This company also asks its suppliers to “give the names of your most important COMPANYs for
reference, including percentage of your sales to them,” and to opine on “what would be the mutual
dependence that you perceive to be acceptable in a business relationship with Company.” Quality
Management System, Supplier Information Form from Large Company (confidential).
95 Interview with Supply Chain VP from a Large Health Care Machine Company (July 2013).
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wanted to be able to do this without causing its suppliers severe financial harm or
pushing them into bankruptcy.93 Doing either of these things would likely
damage the buyer’s reputation, make its other suppliers less likely to make relationship-specific investments, and force the buyer to bear the cost of switching to
another supplier when demand increased. Indeed, a major benefit to OEMs of
outsourcing is the ability to shift part of the risk of downstream changes in
product demand to their suppliers. In some contexts, suppliers may be better
able to bear this risk than an internal firm division that produces only for intrafirm consumption. The cost to a supplier of redeploying manufacturing assets to
another purpose is likely to be less than the cost to an internal division of a firm of
doing so. Unlike a supplier, an internal division would lack contacts with other
purchasers and would not have a developed sales infrastructure.
Buyers obtain additional governance benefits from keeping their buy under
20 percent. First, it strengthens the credibility of the buyer’s threat to either
reduce its buy or terminate a particular supplier due to low scorecard ratings.
Second, when buyers keep the buy percentage low, the supplier’s threat to exit
the relationship if the buyer behaves opportunistically is more credible, which
in turn creates an incentive for the buyer not to misbehave.
Explaining this practice, one procurement manager said that she wanted to be
able to give her “supplier a giant nudge or kick in the pants,” but did not want the
power to “be able to hit him with a hammer,”94 because at the end of the day,
given how fast word of bad actions gets around, doing so would likely jeopardize
her relationships with her other suppliers. And, as a manager at a large supplier
explained, the OEMs wanted to shy away from deals that would make them
appear “accountable”95 for the success or failure of a supplier’s business.
Nevertheless, even when the buy percentage is kept low, additional constraints
on buyer behavior are needed. As discussed further in Section 5 below, network
governance also plays an important role in achieving this.
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3.3 Conclusion

In sum, buyers and suppliers have created an array of contract governance
mechanisms that enable them to create highly cooperative contracting relationships for goods made to the buyer’s specification. However, these mechanisms,
standing alone, will be much less effective in maintaining cooperation when
transactors enter into more complex undertakings such as those involving joint
or supplier-led innovation. They will also be largely ineffective in enabling new
transacting partners to engage in these types of undertakings at the outset of
their contracting relationships.96 In transactions involving prospective
Downloaded from http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/ at Serials Department on November 1, 2016

96 Three leading contract theorists, however, have suggested that contracts can endogenously create
trust-based social capital from scratch, even in contexts in which the initial transaction between the
firms is a complex agreement involving innovation that has important non-contractable elements.
See Gilson, Sabel, & Scott (2009, 2010, 2012) . These authors look with great care at the language of
ten “prototype” agreements and conclude that “parties today often treat trust as endogenous, as an
object of contracting rather than as a precondition . . . [and] write contracts in which they manifestly
intend to establish a deeply collaborative relation, where little or none existed before.” Gilson, Sabel,
& Scott (2010, p. 1404) (emphasis added). They identify two types of contract provisions that they
view as providing the agreement’s most important contract governance mechanisms. First are provisions that are designed to operationalize a “commitment to an ongoing mutual exchange of
information designed to determine if a project is feasible, and if so, how to best implement the
parties’ joint objectives.” Gilson, Sabel & Scott (2010, p. 1403). Second are “contract referee mechanism[s]” that require unanimity for key decisions and require that disputes be referred up the chain
of command if they cannot be resolved at lower levels (p. 1403).
However, a closer look at the contracting relationships surrounding the ten prototype contracts
reveals that pre-existing relational social capital between the transactors and/or structural social
capital (that is, the network position of the firms) was present in all but one of these contracting
relationships and may therefore, as the theory discussed in the text suggests, also have played an
under-appreciated role in the governance of these agreements and in transactors’ willingness to have
entered into them.
Three contracts involved companies who had been doing business with one another long before
the studied transaction, giving sufficient time for relationship-specific social capital to have developed. Prior to the Phoenix Technologies Ltd. & Intel Corp. Supply Contract, supra note 80, the
parties had been co-developing products since at least 1988, see, Ed Scannell, “Phoenix Ships MCACompatible BIOS,” InfoWorld (August 1, 1988). They also had strong connections to common
customers as both supplied the same makers of generic personal computers, see Michael W. Miller,
“IBM PC Clones Multiply Amid Price Battles,” Wall St. Journal, (June 17, 1986). Moreover, on the
day this agreement was signed, Intel purchased 11 million dollars of Phoenix Stock, thereby introducing an additional and potentially important governance mechanism into the mix. See Phoenix
Technologies Ltd. & Intel Corp, Common Stock and Warrant Purchase Agreement, (Dec. 18, 1995).
Similarly, the parties to the Allstate Insurance Co. & Acxiom Corp., Data Management Outsourcing
Agreement (March 19, 1999), had been dealing with one another for at least 6 years prior to this
contract. See Funding Universe, Acxiom Corporation History, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/
company-histories/acxiom-corporation-history/. And, prior to the John Deere & Co. & Stanadyne
Corp., Long Term Agreement (Deere & Stanadyne 2001), an agreement that these authors suggest
“help[ed] to establish and maintain a long-term supply arrangement,” (Gilson, Sabel, & Scott 2009,
p. 458), the transactors had been doing business for at least 50 years. See American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, Rotary Distributor Fuel Injection Pump: National Historic Engineering
Landmark (April 1988), https://www.asme.org/getmedia/488b1889-a13e-4c03-9bee-5f33d309fbba/
131-Diesel-Fuel-Injection-Pump.aspx at 3. Moreover, the extent to which innovation was
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innovation, the parties might not have a clear idea of what is to be produced,
how to manufacture it, or how to assess whether the finished part meets their
overall expectations. As a result, there will be fewer if any metrics they can
use to objectively assess one another’s performance, thereby increasing
the risk of misunderstanding, conflict and relationship breakdown. Yet, the
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contemplated as part of this particular contract as opposed to in the context of the parties’ contracting relationship writ large, is unclear given that the preamble to this contract stated that “[t]he
scope of this agreement covers current products purchased from Stanadyne Corporation. The
products in-scope are the current DB rotary mechanical products, fuel filtration products, standard
and RSN pencil injection nozzles, DE10 pumps and the Series 250 Fuel Injection system” (Deere &
Stanadyne, p. 2).
Another three contracts took place between a buyer and an entity it had recently spun off, again
suggesting that pre-contractual relationship-specific social capital was present. For background on
the Apple Computer, Inc. & SCI Systems Inc., Fountain Manufacturing Agreement (May 31, 1996), see
New York Times, “Apple Agrees to Sell a Big Macintosh Plant,” (April 5, 1996); For background on
the American Axle & Manufacturing Inc. & General Motors Co., Component Supply Agreement (June
5, 1998), see Joseph P. Ritz, “New Firm Offers to Buy GM Saginaw Plants Facilities in Buffalo,
Tonawanda, St. Catharine’s Affected; UAW Officials Angry,” The Buffalo News, at A1 (September
10, 1993) (six former GM employees sat on the American Axle board of directors); and, finally, for
background on the Boeing Co. & Spirit Aero Systems Inc., General Terms Agreement (June 30, 2006),
see Boeing Company 2005 Annual Report, http://investors.boeing.com/investors/financial-reports/
default.aspx at 28.
Two of the contracts were biotech alliances. As discussed in the text, infra text accompanying
notes 125–133, the structure and governance of these types of agreements is strongly affected by
another sort of social capital, namely structural social capital, see infra text accompanying note 8,
that has been demonstrated to be a potent governance force in biotech transactions. However, interpersonal social capital was also present in both of these transactions. In the Pharmacopeia & BristolMyers Squib, Collaboration and Licensing Agreement (November 26, 1997), the Director of Biology at
Pharmocopeia had spent the previous seven years at Bristol-Myers as a high-ranking scientist. See
Sue Rodney, “Pharmacopeia, Inc. Announces Senior Management Appointments,” PR Newswire,
(November 1, 1996). http://search.proquest.com/docview/450067348?accountid¼14657. In the
Warner-Lambert Co. & Ligand Pharmaceuticals Inc., Research, Development and License Agreement
(September 1, 1999), two members of Ligand’s board of directors had previously held high-ranking
executive positions at Parke-Davis, a Warner subsidiary and the division responsible for administering this agreement. In addition, Ligand had done business in the past with Parke-Davis before it
was taken over by Warner and as part of this transaction it purchased $2.5 million in Ligand stock.
The LA Times, Ligand, Warner in Research Collaboration (September 2, 1999), http://articles.latimes.
com/1999/sep/02/business/fi-5903. Finally, it is interesting to note that in the years prior to this
transaction, Ligand was also very central in the relevant network of firms. (Caspter, 2007).
The remaining co-development contract, the Nanosys, Inc. & Matsushita Electric Works, Ltd.,
Development Agreement (November 18, 2002), dealt with nano-technology. It involved a business strategy
on the part of the R&D-centered company Nanosys that could not work without entering into a
significant number of strategic alliances with large partners who could produce and market products
using their technology. The need to partner with these large firms (some of whom transacted with one
another and whose employees often moved from firm to firm) situated the transaction in a network of
firms that further reduced the likelihood that Nanosys would intentionally breach the contract they
entered into with their first large partner, Matsushita Electric Works.
Finally, the remaining contract did not involve any co-development; it was merely a sale of an
airplane to an end user. See AVSA S.A.R.L. & New Air Corp., Airbus A320 Purchase Agreement (April 20,
1999).
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very governance frameworks that cannot themselves govern these more complex
deals can, when implemented over time in a particular contracting relationship,
create the conditions in which they can thrive. As discussed further below, these
frameworks can facilitate the creation of trust-based relational social capital that,
in combination with the force of network governance, can create the conditions
that make it more likely that buyers and suppliers will be able to more readily
identify and more successfully bond these types of increasingly complex and
innovative value-creating undertakings.

4.1 Introduction

The governance frameworks created by MSAs and the contract administration
mechanisms used to implement them promote the growth of trust-based relationship-specific social capital in three important ways. First, as discussed
above, they create conditions that support the emergence of repeat
dealing relationships which in turn grow relational capital that is valuable to
firms.97 Second, these frameworks facilitate the types of investments, norms,
and interactions that are commonly associated with the emergence of trust—
defined as “the expectation that both actors will behave in a mutually acceptable
manner, including an expectation that neither party will exploit the other’s
vulnerabilities.”98 And third, many aspects of these frameworks memorialize

97 For sources documenting this effect, see papers cited in Elfenbein & Zengler (2014).
98 Schilke & Cook (2015, p. 277). There is another prominent definition of trust in the social capital
literature that if used to understand commercial contracting would be problematic. As a leading
social capital theorist explained “trust is a relationship with someone (or something if the object of
trust is a group, organization, or social category) in which contractual terms are incompletely
specified. The more unspecified, taken-for-granted the terms, the more that trust is involved.”
Burt (2005, p. 93). However, there are reasons to question the suggestion that a more complex or
detailed contract is an indication of a less trusting relationship and the implicit assumption that the
terms specified in a written agreement will necessarily be complied with through the force or shadow
effect of the law.
First, a detailed contract may be the outcome of a negotiation process that was deliberately
structured to build trust-based social capital. In these settings, a longer contract (if it results from
these trust-building activities) may indicate more rather than less trust. Indeed, lawyers negotiating
information technology outsourcing contracts have developed a carefully structured and iterated
negotiating process that typically lasts 6 months to a year and artfully combines most of the elements
identified by social capital theorists as contributing to the accumulation of trust. By the time the
contract is ready for signature, the parties have learned about one another’s business culture and had
an opportunity to see if their corporate cultures are compatible (a process sometimes referred to as
mutual value discovery); have been faced with working through a series of increasingly difficult
issues involving both concrete problems and judgment calls; and have developed an ethos of transparency in their interactions—interactions that are structured to include not only lawyers and
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contract administration routines and firm policies that are similar to those that
have been shown to increase organization-to-organization trust in relationships
between automakers and their suppliers.
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executives, but also, after the initial negotiating sessions, the members of the business teams that will
implement the contract. At the conclusion of the negotiations, care is taken to emphasize that
“trust” is central to the transaction, but that careful writings are also needed to memorialize understandings in case either party experiences a change in key personnel. (Interview with Outsourcing
Lawyer, March 2014). See Information Services Group, IT Infrastructure Outsourcing Helps Shell
Lower Cost, Drive Increased Efficiency (2013) (providing an example of an IT outsourcing contract
where a similar mutual negotiation/value discovery process was used to negotiate and structure a
deal).
Second, when dealing with a trusted contracting partner, it is easier to access the operational
benefits of clarity and specificity (benefits that arise both within and across the contracting firms)
without the downside risk of inflexibility that is often associated with detailed provisions. If you
trust your partner to be flexible in contexts where implementing precise provisions does not make
business sense, you are more likely to use precise terms. Third, when lawyers draft contracts, they
rarely start from a blank slate. Rather, they begin with a template, and adapt it to the individual
transaction. Detail that is not necessary, but also not harmful, tends to remain in these agreements.
This weakens the connection between detail and trust that would be more likely to exist if contracts
(as the sociological and organizational behavior literatures seem to assume) were drafted anew for
each transaction and included only those provisions the parties themselves viewed as necessary.
Moreover, even if the contracts were drafted anew, the lawyers would insist on the inclusion of
provisions that would be unnecessary from the parties’ private (and perhaps trust-based) calculus,
simply because lawyers would likely want to avoid second guess risk. See Bernstein (2001). Fourth,
clear contracts can also support trust-based relationalism by providing focal points that support
norms of reciprocity. For reciprocity norms to function properly, the transactors need to have at
least a rough mental account of who is the giver and who is the taker. See Hart (2008). When these
mental accounts become unbalanced, or transactors’ perceptions of their balance fall out of alignment, transaction breakdown is more likely to occur. Recognizing this dynamic suggests that there is
no necessary connection between contract detail and trust. Fifth, transactors who have dealt with
one another on a repeat basis over a long period of time might also choose to include more detailed
descriptions of the desired performance, even if their trust in one another were either increasing or
remaining constant. The managers who negotiate the detailed provisions in scope of work and
service level agreements might (if they are good agents) memorialize in writing the things they
learned about one another’s expectations, needs, and operations, for two reasons. First, to reduce the
interruptions caused by changes in personnel—in which case the length of the contract might be an
indication of the importance of their tacit understandings. And, second, to ensure that accurate
information about the deal flows through both their own and their partner’s hierarchy of operations
in a consistent way. In addition, at the outset of the relationship, the employee who set up the deal
(the “broker,” see infra note 124) might want to keep its terms vague, so that he remains indispensable to the administration of the deal and therefore better able to capture the individual returns
associated with brokerage. Over time, however, he will want to find new opportunities to broker, so
he would be expected to be more willing to specify the operational aspects of the deals he helped to
create. See, e.g., Argyres, Bercovitz, & Mayer (2007) (demonstrating in the context of a long-term
supply contract in the electronics industry that the Statements of Work became more detailed over
time and came to reflect what the parties learned from one another). Finally, the assumption that
specified provisions will be complied with due to the force of the law is simply false. The mere fact
that something is specified in a contract, even completely specified, does not mean that it will be
done, unless there is some other force motivating performance, like reputation, morality, or coercion of other sorts.
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4.2 The Effect of Prior Dealings on Current Dealings

99 Elfenbein & Zenger (2014, p. 223) (noting that this institutional feature provides “additional confidence that the results . . . [of the study] reflect the relationship’s true economic value to the firm.”).
For a study that also found a large effect of prior transactions on willingness to transact again in the
context of strategic alliances, see Gulati & Gargiulo (1999, pp. 1453–1454) (drawing on “longitudinal data on strategic alliances in a sample of American, European, and Japanese organizations in
three industries over a 20-year period,” and demonstrating that “the probability of a new alliance
between specific organizations increases with their prior mutual alliance, common third parties, and
joint centrality in an alliance network.”).
100 Elfenbein & Zenger (2014, p. 237). Similarly, a European-Israeli Mechanical Engineer/Businessman
in the specialty machine business, a context where the functional abilities of the machine to be
produced can be specified, but what is to be produced cannot be described, reported that the
companies he has dealt with in the past are willing to pay him at least a 15 percent premium
over the lowest bidder, due to the quality of his past performance (Interview, September 2014).
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The importance and impact of prior dealings on buyers’ decision-making about
whom to deal with and on what terms, has been empirically established in the
industrial procurement context; it has been shown to be important even in
transactions involving almost no uncertainty or relationship-specific
investment.
The most carefully conducted study that looked at the effect of prior dealing
on partner selection and transaction price, examined the reverse auctions conducted by the procurement department of a large mid-western industrial firm
(Elfenbein & Zenger 2014). In advance of the bidding, all auction participants
were prequalified as being able to supply the good in question at the desired
quality level. The goods were primarily “commodity parts that can be well
specified in a contract” (Elfenbein & Zengler 2014, p. 337). After bidding
closed, corporate procurement managers chose the winning bid in consultation
with “officers and divisional staff” (who had in turn consulted plant managers).
This process was designed to reduce “the scope for private benefits or friendship
ties to influence these outcomes.”99 As the authors explained, the “collaborative
nature of the selection process, transparency of alternatives and decisions, and
organizational norms requiring careful justification of supplier choice all
worked together to limit the influence of private benefits or personal affinity
on partner selection” (Elfenbein & Zenger 2014, p. 228).
The study found that “the value created by past exchange is economically
meaningful” (Elfenbein & Zenger 2014, p. 228). In particular, the authors’
estimates indicate that increasing relationship length from the mean in the
sample (roughly 7 months) to one standard deviation above the mean (roughly
30 months) “is associated with an increase in willingness to pay of 8.5% (95%
confidence interval: . . . 5.2-14.9%).”100 It also found that the greater the risk of
ex-post exchange hazards or the more complex the goods, the greater was the
effect of past dealing on the premium the buyer was willing to pay. More
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broadly, the authors concluded that the study confirmed the “consensus across
a wide range of literature . . . that continued and repeated exchange generates a
valuable asset that is both ‘created and leveraged through relationships’ that
provides assurances against the threat of ex-post opportunism, and that facilitates adaptation and problem solving.”101
4.3 Trust-based Relational Social Capital

101 Elfenbein & Zenger (2014, p. 224) (internal citation omitted). Another study that explores the
connection between repeat dealing, trust, and transaction terms is Gulati (1995a, p. 85). Drawing
on a study of strategic alliances “formed between 1970 and 1989 in the biopharmaceutical, new
materials and automotive economic sectors by American, European and Japanese firms,” the paper
explores the use of equity in strategic alliances. It finds “strong evidence that repeated alliances
between two partners are less likely than other alliances to be organized using equity,” a finding that
it attributes to the “role of inter-firm trust that emerges from repeat alliances between the same
partners.” However, this conclusion should be viewed with caution. As the paper itself points out,
while interview evidence supports the conclusion that trust explains the decreased likelihood of
taking an equity stake in repeat transactions, the quantitative empirics presented cannot rule out the
possibility that this is due simply to the fact that “two firms will prefer a non-equity alliance only
when they already have an equity alliance . . . [because] once two firms share one hostage it obviates
the need for additional hostages” (Gulati 1995a, p. 94).
102 See Gulati & Gargiulo (1999, p. 1455) (“Beneath the formalities of contractual agreements, multiple
informal interpersonal relationships emerge across organizational boundaries, which facilitate the
active exchange of information and the production of trust that fosters inter-organization
cooperation.”).
103 Gulati & Gargiulo (1999, p. 1445) (concluding based on extensive interviews among participants in
strategic alliances that “personal relationships among key individuals have played a crucial role in
producing trust between organizations in Japanese industrial groups . . . and in contractual
relationships.”).
104 Roden & Lawson (2014) (drawing on a survey of UK firms to demonstrate that when buyers and
suppliers make bilateral relationship-specific investments (adaptations), they create relational
capital).
105 See, e.g., Knoppen & Christiaanse (2007, pp. 228–229) (presenting case studies of supply relationships in which “partners admitted that trust had grown over the years, by living through good and
bad times together,” and concluding that “the satisfactory resolution of negative themes or crises
fostered trust,” and illustrating it with an example in which the parties’ contracting relationship
“substantially improve[d] through the occurrence of a severe quality problem.”).
106 See, e.g., Gulati (1995a, p. 92) (suggesting that through ongoing interactions firms learn about each
other and develop trust “around norms of equity.”).
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The social capital literature identifies a number of different aspects of exchange
relationships that create the conditions under which interpersonal trust is most
likely to arise. These include: the exchange of information;102 the formation of
personal ties among the firms’ employees (and their associated character assessments and loyalties);103 the making of reciprocal relationship-specific investments;104 the acquisition of experience in successful problem solving;105
and the emergence and observance of norms of reciprocal flexibility.106
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107 See Gulati (1995a, p. 90, nn. 1) (defining tacit knowledge as “knowledge that . . . typically resides in
patterns of relationships, norms, information flows, ways of making decisions, and other organizational factors.”).
108 However, it is important to note that it is not clear whether information sharing leads to trust or trust
leads to information sharing, See Dyer & Chu (2003, p. 66) (“Trust. . . . appears to have a mutually
causal relationship with information sharing that also creates value in the exchange relationship.”).
109 See infra text accompanying notes 148–153 (describing Harley’s Supplier Council and Resident
Engineer Program). See also Cummins (2010, Sec. e(2) and K(7)) (describing the company’s
Advance Product Quality Planning Process that “brings the supplier’s management, Cummins.
Inc., plant management, engineering, purchasing and others together at different stages of the
process.”).
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Although social capital theorists differ in the emphasis they place on each of
these potential sources of trust, the frameworks used in OEM–supplier relationships support all of the conditions enumerated above that are associated
with trust creation.
Information Exchange Suppliers provide buyers with a great deal of information as part of the supplier qualification process. They are also required to: share
detailed costing data when bidding on a part, provide quality control reports at
regular intervals, permit the buyer to audit their books and records, and provide
the buyer with timely information relevant to the operation of their production
line. Buyers have few information disclosure obligations apart from a duty to
provide non-binding rolling forecasts on a monthly or quarterly basis.
However, the most important exchanges of information for the purposes of
building trust may be the transfer of more tacit information107 that occurs when
buyer and supplier employees interact with one another in person.108
Personal ties These contracting frameworks encourage the formation of personal ties between the buyer and supplier’s employees in numerous ways.
Among them are: the quarterly business review meetings where buyer and
supplier management meet; the many social events and conventions buyers
host for their suppliers; the interactions on the production floor required by
quality manuals; and the interactions that take place when buyer employees
visit supplier premises to help implement process improvements or when suppliers’ engineers take up residence at the buyer’s offices to help with product
design.109
Reciprocal relationship-specific investments OEM–supplier relationships involve reciprocal relationship-specific investments even before the parties
enter into their first contract because participation in supplier qualification
programs is costly to both the buyer and the supplier. These required investments continue into the early stages of the relationship. The buyer bears the cost
of sending either outside consultants or its own development team into the
supplier’s plant to help it improve its operations. In turn, the supplier must
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110 Reciprocal relationship-specific investments are also encouraged and required as part of tooling
agreements. See Harley-Davidson (2003, “Tooling Management Module”) (“Harley-Davidson
highly recommends that the production supplier be integrated into the design process for new
tooling.”).
111 Dyer & Chu (2000, p. 264) (providing an overview of the writing in sociology and anthropology that
supports this view of how reciprocal norms are established.).
112 Dyer & Chu (2000, p. 265) (finding that in transactions between automakers and their suppliers “the
greater the assistance provided by the buyer to the supplier, the greater the supplier’s trust in the
buyer.”).
113 For a description of one such program, see Stegner, Butterfield, & Evers (2015) (describing the
program at John Deere).
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bear the costs of making the changes in their plant and operating procedures
that are needed to meet the requirements set out in the buyer’s quality
handbooks.110
Problem solving Buyers and suppliers are likely to acquire experience solving
problems during the make-to-spec stage of their relationships. Although these
transactions are generally cooperative, problems nevertheless arise and buyers’
needs change in ways that require contractual adjustments. Dealing with these
problems gives the firm’s employees a chance to work through problems before
they become overly complex, and enables them to gain familiarity with the
organizational cultures of one another’s firms.
Norms of reciprocity Finally, a number of OEM practices encourage norms of
reciprocity that are commonly said to “begin[] with a starting mechanism,
which may take the form of a gift or other acts of assistance.”111 These include:
the teams of consultants and process engineers that OEMs often send to their
suppliers’ plants at their own expense;112 the classes offered by firms like Deere
and CAT to help suppliers improve their operational abilities; the institutionalized supplier development programs like JDCrop113 that help suppliers improve their operations and develop cost-saving ideas; and the common practice
of not imposing fines for subpar performance even when performance is clearly
deficient. More generally, the clarity in these contracts makes them a good
reference point around which norms of reciprocity are likely to grow (Hart
2008).
Together, these aspects of the contracting frameworks used in procurement
contracts, and the types of interactions they directly or indirectly encourage,
create the conditions under which social capital theorists suggest trust is most
likely to emerge.
Although the role of trust in OEM–supplier relationships has not been studied quantitatively, quantitative studies of automaker–supplier relationships
have demonstrated the economic benefit of trust in that context.114
Moreover, the interview-based study of mid-west OEMs115 and their suppliers
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114 Dyer & Chu (2003, pp. 63–64) (presenting the results of an empirical study of the effect of trust on
transactions costs in transactions between US, Japanese, and Korean automakers and their suppliers,
which shows that “there is a strong correlation between automakers’ trustworthiness and profit
performance.”).
115 For a description of this data source, see Whitford (2006).
116 One supplier noted that upon entering into a contracting relationship, it tried to “spread like a
virus,” forming interpersonal relationships across all levels of the buyer’s operation, because having
strong relationships across a buyer’s operations, including “manufacturing, engineering, management to some extent, marketing . . . all over the place . . . helps us solve problems.” NOE Respondent.
And an OEM explained that it was sometimes worthwhile to buy from a long-time partner even at a
higher price because when you need a favor like a very fast turnaround “they do it” and are willing to
“jump through hoops” because they know you will be back. NOE Respondent.
117 NOE Respondent. One supplier noted that it was the sole source of a product to a trustworthy OEM
that never bid out its designs and that they shared costing data and worked harder to improve
products. The supplier attributed its willingness to share its data to its relationships not only with
buyer’s procurement personnel but also with people throughout the buyer’s hierarchy, from the
president to the production line. The supplier noted, however, that they would not share this type of
information with another OEM who dual-sources the product and whom they do not really trust.
NOE Respondent.
118 See infra text accompanying note 163.
119 See Rickert et al. (2000, pp. 33–34) (discussing and quoting suppliers’ views of the connection
between OEMs’ past behavior, trust, and their willingness to make relationship-specific investments). One supplier noted that they were willing to make relationship-specific investments to
get more business from John Deere but they were not willing to do so with the auto companies.
It explained that the auto companies “talk partnership . . . but they could be out [of the relationship]
in a second, so we are very careful about the investments we make for their parts. We have learned
anything can go.” NOE Respondent.
120 NOE Respondent. One supplier who was considering working with Deere’s supplier development
program explained that before deciding whether to participate, he wanted to visit the plant of
another local supplier that had been part of the program. He explained that, among other things,
he really wanted to know if Deere in fact shared cost savings 50-50 as they claimed.
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suggests that trust-based relationship-specific social capital plays an important
role in work-a-day contractual behavior and influences firm decision-making in
ways that likely affect the value of these commercial relationships.
Among the most important and consistent viewpoints expressed in the interviews were: interpersonal relationships make it easier to solve problems;116 trust
leads suppliers to reveal more accurate costing information to buyers;117 buyers
are more willing to share technological advances and do co-design with suppliers they trust;118 suppliers were more willing to make relationship-specific
investments when they trusted buyers;119 and suppliers actively seek reputation
information about buyers.120 These findings are consistent with suppliers’
widely held perception that turnover in buyer personnel was detrimental to
the smooth functioning of relationships. Suppliers repeatedly noted that this
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4.4 Interorganizational Trust

The contracting frameworks adopted by large OEMs may also play a role in
creating interorganizational trust. Studies of automaker–supplier relationships
have shown that suppliers have more trust in firms that have standardized
supplier qualification programs, clear rules about the conditions under which
a firm wins business, well-run supplier development programs, and, perhaps
most importantly, consistent procurement attitudes and processes writ large
(Dyer & Chu 2011). The many supplier handbooks, supplier development

121 See, e.g., Cousins & Menguc (2006, p. 615) (presenting a survey-based study of UK firms that found
that when buyers attempted to socialize their suppliers through “supplier conferences, regular
meetings (formal and informal), telephone conferences, and site visits,” there was “a strong direct
relationship between the level of the supplier’s socialization and contractual conformance”); see also
Dyer & Chu (2011, pp. 31–32) (discussing quantitative studies of trust that demonstrate its economic value).
122 Over time, long-standing relationships may be affected by the same type of group-think that can
pervade an internal division of a firm. However, these risks are attenuated in the outsourcing
context. The supplier will continue to interact with other buyers. These other buyers will learn
things from other suppliers of the same or similar goods, thereby obviating the emergence of
group-think across their supply relationships. Indeed, while individual firms have come up with
internal structures that are designed to avoid group-think—such as Steve Jobs’s practice at Apple of
having multiple teams working on the same general idea in isolated pods—the avoidance or mitigation of group-think may be one of the major benefits of outsourcing.
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turnover made them less likely to share accurate costing information and more
reluctant to participate in buyer-sponsored supplier development programs
(Rickert et al. 2000).
Although the trust and loyalty created by interpersonal social capital are often
valuable,121 they may also be costly. Managers might favor certain suppliers out
of feelings of friendship or loyalty, even when they are not the best suppliers
available. Friendship might also lead managers to soften the type of criticism
often needed to improve production methods.122 However, firms have developed ways to detect and mitigate these costs. Supplier scorecards and the
quarterly business reviews held to discuss them function as an intra-buyer firm
mechanism to counter any distortions introduced by personal loyalties between
buyer and supplier representatives. The scorecards provide objective metrics on
supplier performance that are accessible to and regularly reviewed by higher
level managers, who are not as personally involved in management of the particular relationship. They therefore limit the ability of a supply chain manager
to hide supplier underperformance. In addition, if relational ties become problematic, supply chain managers can easily depersonalize exchanges by rotating
their purchasing staff.
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4.5 Brokerage (Seeing Value-Creating Opportunities)

The types of governance structures that OEMs use to facilitate cooperation and
build interorganizational trust and trust-based relational capital do far more
than increase transactors’ perceptions of the likelihood of performance. They
also create the conditions under which some employees of both firms are, over
time, more likely to identify either additional value-creating transactions or
cost-reducing product, process, or materials changes.
As the contracting relationship matures and the employees of both firms
interact through development programs, conferences, and the meetings held
in the regular course of administering their contracts, some are likely to begin to
trust one another. As this trust builds, employees of both firms become increasingly likely to share information. And, as they become better acquainted with
one another’s operations, culture, and specialized language they will be better
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programs, approved material lists, standard sets of terms and conditions, and
clearly defined and understood procurement practices adopted by firms like
Deere and Harley may well play a similar role in helping these firms establish
trusting relationships with their suppliers. One purchasing manager, who
praised Deere and Harley for their consistency in their supplier relations, explained that another OEM who was a subsidiary of a foreign corporation was
viewed as being considerably less trustworthy since it had a very different culture and did not operate in predictable ways. This observation closely paralleled
the observation of one of the suppliers in the automaker study who explained
that “we cannot trust U.S. automakers as much as Japanese automakers because
whenever they bring in new management, we get a whole new set of procurement rules and policies. The rules of the game are constantly changing. With
Japanese companies we don’t seem to have the same problems” (Dyer & Chu
2000, p. 277).
In sum, the frameworks that support the creation of relational social capital
are expensive to create and maintain. Nevertheless, buyers often opt for relational governance even when an arms-length contract could adequately govern
their deal. Relational capital increases flexibility, enables the parties to rely on
reciprocal informal adjustments being made over time, and leads to the sharing
of information that can greatly reduce production costs. Moreover, as discussed
further below, one reason firms opt for relational contracting is that many of
the interactions among employees that successfully build relational social
capital also increase the likelihood that employees of both firms will be
able to identify additional value-creating transactions between their firms—a
benefit that may well justify even the very significant costs of relational
governance.
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123 See Burt (2005, p. 17) (“Opinions and behaviors within a group are often expressed in a local
language, a dialect fraught with taken-for-granted assumptions shared within a group. The local
language makes it possible for people in the group to exchange often-repeated data more quickly . . . [yet] the more specialized the language within groups . . . the greater the difficulty in moving
ideas between groups.”); Harley Davidson produces a list of Harley acronyms to assist its suppliers in
understanding their communications with the company. See Harley-Davidson (2003, “Acronyms”).
Of the 154 acronyms listed, 37 have Harley-specific meanings, 6 have more than one general meaning that can easily be confused with the Harley meaning and the rest are widely used and can be
found in a simple Google search.
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able to appreciate the meaning and importance of this information.123 This
exchange of both tacit and explicit information, in turn makes it more likely
that the firm’s employees will be able to identify additional ways to create joint
value—that is, to engage in what social capital theorists call “brokerage.” As
these opportunities are identified, the length of the perceived shadow of future
dealing between the transactors lengthens, which, in turn, makes it less likely
that either will breach or behave opportunistically in their current dealings.
John Deere’s supplier development philosophy implicitly recognizes the connection between buyers slowly deepening their relational ties with suppliers and
the prospect of value-creating brokerage. Deere strives to “mature its providers
over time,” even those that initially provide “commodities,” or “generic” parts.
It uses suppliers’ behavior in these early deals to decide whether it is worthwhile
to deepen its relationship with them. If these relationships do not go well, they
are terminated within a year. In contrast, “if things go well, trust accumulates
between buyer and seller and they can enter into a deeper relationship that
generates more value for both of them” (Moore et al. 2002, Appendix A, p. 128).
In Deere’s view this “value flows from increasing data exchange and [using]
joint work to improve the performance and cost of products and processes” (p.
128). It also has the advantage of “train[ing] providers in Deere’s culture,
making it increasingly easy for them to respond to Deere’s needs in a reliable
way” (p. 129), so that Deere will eventually be able to give them far broader
responsibility within the contracting relationship, including responsibility for
design and/or innovation.
More generally, the recognition that relational governance can increase the
likelihood of value-creating brokerage suggests that contract provisions and
contract administration procedures that dictate how often buyer and supplier
personnel at particular levels of the organization interact, together with the
breadth of the confidentiality constraints each firm imposes on its employees
vis-à-vis employees of its contracting partners, may be quite important to both
the value of future deals and the governance of present deals.
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5. STRUCTURAL SOCIAL CAPITAL: NETWORK GOVERNANCE

124 See Burt (2005, pp. 94–97, 104–105) (suggesting that opportunities for brokerage are often identified
before the trust needed to take advantage of them has developed). See also Vanpoucke, Vereecke, &
Boyer (2014, Table 2) (demonstrating through six longitudinal studies of contracting relationships
that sufficient trust to support moving from the “exploratory” stage—that is, the make-to-spec stage
where there is no expectation of long-term dealings—to the “expansion” stage which is “triggered by
a high level of trust,” and involves some degree of integration between the parties, took from about
four to fifteen years, and that an additional five or more years were needed for full knowledge
sharing).
However, in some contexts, even when this relationship-specific social capital is absent, contracts
can be adequately bonded by interorganizational trust, a type of trust that can grow relatively
quickly. Dyer & Chu (2000, p. 275).
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Wholly apart from the type of relationship-specific social capital discussed
above, which might build too slowly to be useful in many transactional contexts,124 there is another type of social capital, “structural social capital,” that
derives its value from the positions of a firm and its contracting partner in a
relevant network of firms. A network is simply a set of connections between
individuals or between organizations (here, firms). These connections can arise
from prior deals between firms or prior social and business connections between their employees. When these connections exist they “establish[] a link
that lowers the costs (or raises the accuracy) of subsequent communication”
(Robinson & Stuart 2006, p. 243). These links enable firms in the network to
convey “privileged information about one another to other network members . . . [thereby] affect[ing] a counter-party’s reputation among future business partners” (p. 243). As a consequence, when a transaction is embedded in a
network, the hostage value of reputation is much greater than when a transaction is between two firms with few, if any, connections to other firms in the
relevant market (p. 248, Figure 1). It is through its effects on the flow of information that structural social capital can function as a network-based contract
governance mechanism.
To understand the ways that network governance influences transactions, it
is useful to look at its effect on contract compliance and governance writ large.
It is also interesting to explore the way it interacts with contract-related decision-making and contract provisions on a more microlevel. As discussed further below, structural social capital may be harnessed to achieve a variety of
ends. Most notably, it can reduce the need for firms to employ costly governance mechanisms and can make it possible for transactors to use (and reliably
bond) contract provisions that condition on information that would not be
either observable or verifiable to a court or other adjudicatory forum.
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5.1 Biotech Alliances and Network Governance in a Market Context

125 Robinson & Stuart (2006, p. 243). For the mathematical definition of centrality used to quantify it in
the study, see Robinson & Stuart (2006, p. 252).
126 For an intuitive pictorial illustration of these two aspects of network position, centrality and proximity, see Robinson & Stuart (2006, p. 248, Figure 1).
127 Robinson & Stuart (2006, p. 247) (“a property determined by the overall shape of the network”).
128 As Robinson and Stuart explain, “[t]he economic value of centrality lies in the ability of centrally
positioned agents to reduce incentive conflicts after the contract has been initiated by threatening
(implicitly) to sanction opportunistic behavior” (2006, p. 249).
129 Robinson & Stuart (2006, p. 247) (emphasizing that “[p]roximity is a property of a pair of firms”).
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The power of network governance has been most carefully documented in the
context of biotechnology alliances. One study looked at over “38000 alliance
transactions between pharmaceutical firms and biotechnology research firms,”
a transaction type where “agreements are fraught with moral hazard, asymmetric information, and other contracting problems.”125 The network ties employed in the study were the “stock of past alliances” among the studied
firms (p. 243). It found that both firms’ positions in the relevant network of
firms significantly affected the size of the equity stake (which is generally regarded as a key governance mechanism in alliance transactions) that the large
pharmaceutical company took in its alliance partner.
There are two important dimensions of a firm’s position in a network.126 The
first is centrality.127 Conceptually, a firm is said to be central in a network if it
has “a large number of connections to firms, which, in turn, are each linked to
many other firms” (Robinson & Stuart 2006, p. 249). In theory, the more
central a firm is, the more deeply embedded it is in the pattern of communication in the network, and the greater is its power to quickly and effectively
spread the word if its alliance partner acts opportunistically.128 The biotech
alliance study found that “when one of the counterparties is deeply embedded
within [the network, that is, central to it,] the deals they consummate are less
likely to involve equity participation and typically entail lower amounts of
equity when equity is used” (p. 269).
The other important dimension of two firms’ position in a network is their
proximity to one another. Two firms are said to be more proximate “when
fewer intermediaries separate two counterparties.”129 In theory, proximity
should decrease the equity stake taken for two reasons. First, “because more
proximate [firms] have either transacted directly in the past or have engaged in
transactions with an overlapping set of counterparties,” they have far more
information about one “another’s reputation and abilities than do members
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130 Robinson & Stuart (2006, p. 249). In this context, given the many non-contractable aspects of a deal,
transactors are highly unlikely to deal with partners they view as affirmatively untrustworthy at the
outset.
131 The centrality of the biotech firm may also affect incentives since “[c]entral firms tend to have widely
known reputations and to be well regarded by other members of the network.” Because “sanctions
are particularly costly for those with valuable reputations,” these more central firms have more
potential future opportunities that they will lose if negative information about them flows through
the network than do less central firms. Robinson & Stuart (2006, p. 250).
132 Robinson & Stuart (2006, p. 242). Although the study confirmed that both centrality and proximity
affected the power of network governance, it is important to note that it found the effect of centrality
was five times as large as the effect on proximity.
133 Robinson & Stuart (2006, p. 244). In other words, the type of transaction pictured in the bottom
left-hand box in the figure in supra note 7.
134 This was true of the firms in the biotech study, a context in which “the details of a[] [firm’s] conduct
in its past alliance cannot be observed publicly” and “information about past behavior is transmitted
across private information links.” Robinson & Stuart (2006, p. 246). In addition, the study found
that both proximity and centrality were more powerful predictors in alliances between privately held
firms about which less public information is available. This suggests that it was information carried
by the network that influenced the structure of the alliance.
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of a more distant pairing.”130 Second, proximity increases the ability of the large
pharmaceutical firm to sanction the smaller biotechnology firm if it misbehaves. This effect arises because the biotechnology firms’ “set of current and
past collaborators are its more likely [set of future] trading partners” (Robinson
& Stuart 2006, p. 249). As a consequence, proximity gives the large pharmaceutical firm a more credible threat to sanction any misbehavior on the part of
the biotech firm,131 which should lead to a lower equity stake being taken.
Consistent with these predictions, the study found that as “proximity increase[s], equity participation (measured by size and propensity)
diminishes.”132
More broadly, the study documents the ability of structural social capital to
function as a contract governance device with the potential to sanction, and
therefore to deter, opportunism. This suggests that if the lawyers structuring
these deals want to avoid the cost of using an equity stake as a governance
mechanism where it is unnecessary, they need to know more than the “bilateral
transaction history of the firms in question.”133 In particular, they will need to
know the pattern of past alliances and connections in the deal-relevant network
because “opportunism is mitigated by a counterparty’s reputation among [and
position in relation to] potential future contracting partners, not just through
its reputation with preexisting partners” (Robinson & Stuart 2006, p. 244).
The study also demonstrates that network governance can and does work,
even in contexts where detailed information about transactors’ underlying behavior is not widely available.134 It can even be effective in contexts where the
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information that is available publicly—namely outcomes—is too noisy to
convey useful information to putative contracting partners given the low probability of success in such ventures and the wide variety of reasons they fail.135
Indeed, one of the main advantages of network-based governance and one of
the key insights of the network literature is that the information that flows
through networks need not be either directly observable to, or verifiable by,
the recipient to have an impact on the way the recipient views the subject of the
information.136 As a consequence, the network can facilitate the imposition of

We had included ODI in our final list based on its technological competence. But then
we were interested in knowing more about their business integrity and support
structure. Once we realized that they had prior relationships with IBM and Ericsson,
with whom we also had prior technology partnerships, we called managers within those
two and had extensive conversations about ODI. It turned out that IBM had in fact
earlier picked an ODI competitor, whom we were also considering, and subsequently
reversed their decision and picked ODI. These factors were very important in our
decision to pick ODI.
Additional examples abound.
136 Several leading contract theorists, see supra note 96, have largely dismissed the role of network
governance in the context of biotech alliances. They explain that “[w]hile we recognize the role of
reputation as one element of switching costs, we remain skeptical about the extent to which reputation can carry the weight [the Robinson and Stuart Biotechnology study] assign[s] to it. Most
important, it is extremely difficult for third parties, however well connected, to observe the conduct
of the parties. Suppose a venture fails. Given the very low likelihood of finding a successful drug, the
most reasonable inference is that the outcome is the result of bad luck, not poor skills or bad faith.”
Gilson, Sabel, & Scott (2009, nn. 123). This criticism, however, assumes that the network can only
transmit information about the success or failure of the project. It does not fully appreciate the
breadth of the information networks can convey (including information that is neither observable
nor verifiable) about the transactors and their behavior. Indeed, this aspect of information transmission was taken into account by the authors of the biotech study, who recognized that it is because
information across networks is sticky and variable that network position has such an important
impact on contract governance (Robinson & Stuart 2006, 246–247). See also Gulati & Gargiulo
(1999, pp. 1445–1446) (concluding, based on interview evidence and a quantitative study of alliance
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135 Interview evidence from studies of strategic alliances in a variety of industries and high-tech contracting contexts is consistent with the biotech study’s findings about the force of network governance and the existence of the reputation-transmission channels it identified. This evidence suggests
that managers routinely rely on network-provided information (including aggregate assessments of
their potential partner’s business reputation) and their potential partner’s position in the relevant
network of firms when selecting alliance or contracting partners. As one manager explained, “In
some cases . . . our [existing alliance] partner may refer us to another firm about whom we were
unaware . . . . An important aspect of this referral business is of course about vouching for the
reliability of that firm. Thus, if one of our longstanding partners suggests one of their own partners
as a good fit for our needs, we usually consider it very seriously.” Gulati (1993, unpublished, p. 56).
Interviews with managers also support the idea that reputation information not only flows through
networks, but also travels quickly. As one manager of a high-tech firm explained, “If we were to have
a major breakdown in our relationship with HiTech Computer, within thirty days that would be well
known throughout the industry in New England.” Larson (1992, p. 76). Similarly, Gulati (1993, p.
90) reports the comments of a senior manager at Cadence Technologies who implicitly revealed the
interplay of reputation information and network position when he explained that:
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transactions that “the information that flows through the alliance network is not only trustworthy,
but also timely,” and noting that according to one manager “we and our prospective partner must
know about each other’s needs and identify an opportunity for an alliance together in a timely
manner . . . . Our partners from past alliances are one of our most important sources of timely
information about alliance opportunities out there, both with them and with other firms with
whom they are acquainted.”).
137 The observation that information will be conveyed through networks does not necessarily mean that
all of the information will be accurate from an objective point of view or that it will have the same
power to someone who hears it fourth hand as it would to someone who hears it second hand. In
addition, as some types of information (in certain contexts) pass through social networks, their
content is altered by peoples’ propensity to filter what they say according to standard rules of
etiquette, rules that tend to slant opinions expressed by the speaker toward those thought to be
held by the listener. As a consequence of this, information tends to “echo” and move toward extreme
poles of trust and distrust. Although the importance of echo has been demonstrated within firms,
how it might work in reference checks between firms that are currently dealing with one another is
less clear and is likely, in any particular case, to be influenced by the amount of trust between the
speaker and the listener, as well as the tone of their relationship. See Burt (2005, Ch. 4).
Network members do not need to completely trust network-circulated information for it to affect
their actions. Sometimes information that is not viewed as entirely trustworthy might put the
recipient firm on notice that further inquiry is needed before dealing with the firm in question.
This in turn will raise the cost of dealing with the gossiped-about firm and make it a less attractive
contracting partner at the early screening stage.
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nonlegal sanctions for misbehavior on the basis of types of information that
cannot be used by either the legal system or other types of adjudicatory fora to
do so.137
A final important aspect of network governance is that its disciplining effect
can extend to all of the commitments made in a contracting relationship, not
just those whose violation would give the breached-against party a credible
threat to sue. It can therefore create incentives for transactors to refrain from
breaching “interior promises” and from taking opportunistic actions that while
not serious enough to end the relationship, nevertheless impose harm on their
contracting partner. For example, suppose that a supplier refused to permit a
buyer’s representative to conduct an unannounced factory inspection or audit
that was authorized by the MSA. The buyer would not have a credible threat to
sue for damages. It would be unlikely to be able to prove a quantifiable harm
from the breach and a missed inspection is unlikely to be significant enough to
lead it to terminate the supplier. However, the buyer could, especially if this
happened on several occasions, talk to other market participants about the
supplier’s behavior. This type of information might make new partners more
reluctant to contract with the supplier, or make its current partners worried
about its plant’s operation, leading them to exercise their rights of inspection as
well. In contexts like mid-west procurement, where suppliers understand that
word of this type of behavior is likely to spread quickly and impact its
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relationships with other buyers, suppliers will be much less likely to engage in
this behavior in the first place. In sum, the existence of the network serves to
increase the reputational harm and nonlegal sanctions for misbehavior. It
thereby broadens the type of misbehavior that can be policed through multilateral nonlegal sanctions.
5.2 OEMs and Network Governance

138 These figures picture the largest suppliers, since they are required to make these transactions public
under the U.S. securities laws. Data was obtained from the site CSImarket.com. Ingersoll is in the
middle because it is both an OEM and a supplier to other suppliers.
139 The chart above is based on 165 suppliers. Preliminary results for a study looking at 6,624 suppliers
to these firms found them separated by 3.64 steps, again using geodesic distance as a measure of
connectedness.
140 In the language of social capital, this can be understood as a “closed network,” a group within which
connections are so dense that information will circulate quickly and reputations will form. See Burt
(2005, Ch. 3).
141 Calculated using UCINET software’s measure of “geodesic distance,” a measure of the average
distance between any two nodes (firms) in the network.
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There are no quantitative studies exploring the effects of networks on contract
structure or performance in the mid-west OEM procurement context.
However, the interview-based study of market participants and preliminary
research exploring the contractual connections among firms in the relevant
market suggests that network governance is likely to play a role in OEM supplier
transactions. Figure 1, on the top of the next page, is a sociogram of the contracting relationships between three OEM’s—Harley-Davidson, Ingersoll Rand,
and John Deere—and their suppliers (black lines) and the contracting relations
among their suppliers (gray lines).138 These relationships were used as a rough
proxy for interpersonal relationships. The proxy seems reasonable (if crude) in
light of the fact that these contracts tend to be relationally managed. For this
reason, social relationships between the firms’ employees are likely to exist in all
but the newest contracting relationships.
The tightly connected (dense) structure of the connections between firms in
this market makes it likely that reputational information about them will flow
easily through the market.140 In addition, even if the relevant information does
not diffuse on its own, any firm in this network (including the OEMs) that
wanted to actively find out about any other firm would only have to go through
an average of 2.1 firms to get it.141
Given this network structure, if an OEM were to act opportunistically toward
a supplier, word of its misbehavior would likely spread quickly and easily
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Figure 1. Sociogram of the Connections Between Deere, Harley, Ingersoll and their
Suppliers (dark lines) and the Relationships among their Suppliers (light lines)140

142 In this market, supplier employees switch firms quite often. Suppliers are therefore able to learn a
great deal about the contracting behavior of both other suppliers and the OEMs by talking to their
own employees. Interview with Senior Manager of OEM (December 2015). OEMs are quite aware of
the potential effects this movement of employees might have on their reputation. As counsel to an
OEM explained, we know there is a “revolving door of salesmen at our suppliers,” and they bring
their knowledge of how we treat them with them as they move from firm to firm. Interview with
Counsel to OEM (December 2015).
143 For example, a study of the relationship between automotive OEMs and their tier-one suppliers
found that “[s]uppliers . . . provid[e] benefits to each OEM typically in proportion to the working
relations [as measured by the study’s Working Relations Index] they are experiencing. . . . the better
the relations experienced, the greater the benefits provided.” See Planning Perspectives Inc. (2013).
These benefits included having the supplier’s “A team” assigned to their firm as well as the advantages that flow from “advanced technology, more supplier resources committed to their business
and higher quality parts and components”). See Planning Perspectives, Inc. (2014).
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through the relevant supply base.142 This type of information, particularly if it
comes from more than one source, has the potential to damage the OEM’s
reputation, leading to the usual repercussions. Misbehaving OEMs may be
charged a higher price to reflect the perceived risk of dealing with them; their
suppliers may be willing to make fewer (contractually unsecured) relationshipspecific investments; they may find the supplier’s B team rather than its A team
assigned to their account;143 and both current and future suppliers may
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144 The interviews revealed that when a buyer takes advantage of a supplier, word gets out and suppliers
become more reluctant to share innovations or costing information with those buyers. For example,
one supplier explained that when it comes up with a cost-cutting innovation, it shares the innovation immediately with X Co., but “would never take it to [Y Co.], never . . . we know what happens
there,” the proprietary information will leak. NOE Respondent. And, as another supplier explained,
while suppliers are very vulnerable to OEMs taking their ideas for product innovations and improvements and turning around and bidding out production, their ability to do this is tempered by
the relationships the buyer’s and supplier’s employees have formed, and “ultimately, you [the supplier] hope that you have the opportunity to call on those relationships to at least make sure that
there’s a level playing field when the purchasing decision is made. It doesn’t always work that way.
But for the time being, in my mind, it’s the right way to do business.” NOE Respondent. In addition,
OEMs are aware that suppliers talk among themselves and know this information will spread
quickly. Interview with Senior Supply Chain Manager at Large OEM (April 15, 2014).
145 Although the OEMs themselves do not have a particularly strong incentive to share information
about misbehaving suppliers (outside of the standard reference checks that are conducted as part of
supplier qualification programs), the procurement managers whose performance (and with it their
personal compensation) depends on choosing the right suppliers have an incentive to share accurate
information about supplier performance with one another.
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demand additional costly protections in their formal contracts. As a consequence, the force of network governance is likely to deter OEM opportunism
and give these firms an incentive to treat their suppliers fairly.
The constraints imposed on OEMs by virtue of the network are of great value
to suppliers because MSAs contain few safeguards (and even fewer effective
safeguards) against OEM misbehavior.144 They are also valuable to OEMs because they increase the credibility of their commitment to treat their suppliers
fairly.
It might seem counterintuitive that large OEMs who typically have the
option of buying what they need from many sources would care so much
about their reputation with their supply base. However, even firms as powerful
as Apple are deeply concerned about their reputation for treating suppliers
fairly. Recently, when one of Apple’s suppliers filed for bankruptcy, the supplier’s Chief Operating Officer filed a declaration accusing Apple of using “contracts of adhesion” and systematically mistreating its suppliers by using “baitand-switch” tactics (Squiller Declaration at paragraphs 18 and 10, cited in
Apple (2014)). Apple responded to these accusations by seeking to put the
declaration under seal. In its pleading Apple argued that “defamatory statements about the manner in which Apple treats its suppliers would make it more
difficult for Apple to deal with its suppliers” (Apple 2014, count 17, p. 56).
The existence of the network pictured above is also likely to constrain the
actions of suppliers. Buyers can easily reach out to either one another or their
current suppliers to learn about the reputations of putative suppliers.145 In
addition, large OEMs deal with a number of the same suppliers. For example,
the 3 OEMs in Figure 1 share 13 suppliers. Deere and Harley share an additional
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5.3 Buyer-Created Local Networks: Leveraging Closure and Brokerage

Although market-based network governance is a potent force, some OEM
buyers seek to strengthen their commitment to treat their suppliers well by
taking steps to actively encourage the creation of strong interpersonal ties
among the suppliers in their local network.147 For example, in the mid146 The processes and quality control standards imposed by OEMs are reasonably similar to one another, which creates a common understanding (within limits) across the industry about what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Although this homogeneity is not needed for network
governance to be effective, its presence is likely to strengthen it.
147 The now defunct Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) is another example of a company that
facilitated the creation of a network among its contracting and alliance partners that enabled it to
more credibly commit not to behave opportunistically towards them. DEC, which pursued a strategy of entering into strategic alliances with many small companies, held an annual conference where
all of its alliance partners could meet and learn about one another. During these meetings, DEC’s
partners often decided to enter into alliances with one another and used DEC managers as reference
checks for capability and trustworthiness. These conferences increased business opportunities for
DEC’s partners and created two types of network governance benefits for DEC itself. First, as
additional network connections were created among DEC’s partners, the nonlegal sanction each
partner would suffer if they acted opportunistically toward DEC increased. If DEC retaliated by
spreading negative gossip about the partner’s behavior, it might destabilize the current alliances the
partner had with other DEC-affiliated partners and reduce the business opportunities the partner
could potentially take advantage of at the next DEC convention. Second, by promoting the growth
of a network among its suppliers (both a network of actual alliance transactions and a setting in
which gossip could flow among its many alliance partners) DEC bound itself to post more of its
reputation as a bond against its own misbehavior in its relationships with its alliance partners. This, in
turn, made DEC a more attractive alliance partner. By creating and strengthening these interpersonal and inter-organizational ties among its alliance partners, DEC strengthened the effectiveness of
this network-aided governance structure for its many strategic alliances (Gulati 1995b). The existence of this network suggests that a DEC lawyer who was trying to determine what types of formal
governance mechanisms to include in an alliance agreement who did not pay attention to the
network position of the particular partner might include governance provisions that were expensive
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10. Given the relatively small number of OEMs, suppliers realize if they misbehave toward one OEM this information could quickly and easily be shared
with both their other OEM buyers and, perhaps, other putative contracting
partners—thereby costing them far more than the potential loss of one OEM’s
business.
In sum, the fact that these contracting relationships are embedded in a network of highly interconnected firms constrains the actions of both buyers and
suppliers. The network helps to ensure that transactors face multilateral reputation sanctions (and the costs and loss of business that entails) when they act
improperly, rather than merely the loss of a single business partner. By increasing the expected cost of misbehavior to both transactors, the force of network
governance broadens the self-enforcing range of these contracts well beyond the
range that purely bilateral forces could support.146
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and unnecessary, or fail to include governance mechanisms that, while costly, could nonetheless add
value to the deal.
Actively creating networks to bond both contractable and non-contractable aspects of deals and
to increase the sanctions for misbehavior has also been accomplished through trade associations, see
Bernstein (1992, 1996, 2001).
148 See Fitzgerald (1996, p. 55).
149 NOE Respondent. For example, one Harley supplier, when asked if he shared costing data and other
information with Harley, replied that he would, explaining that “I think Harley Davidson is pretty
easy to deal with, I don’t have any issues, I think Harley is a good customer.” NOE Respondent. And
as another supplier noted, Harley was not as ruthless as the auto companies in demanding price cuts
and that his firm is “in it for the long haul with Harley, who is allowing them both to make profits
and they are pretty happy with them.” NOE Respondent.
150 These examples are illustrations of the idea of network closure. See Burt (2005, Ch. 3) (providing an
overview of the effects of network closure).
151 See also Holstrom & Roberts (1998, p. 82) (suggesting that a similar function is played by Toyota’s
Japanese supplier council and is one reason that Toyota organized such a council at its Kentucky
plant).
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1980’s, Harley–Davidson began to actively encourage the creation of a network
of interpersonal ties among its suppliers. To achieve this, it developed and
funded a Supplier Council, consisting of “16 suppliers which, as a group, represent a cross section of Harley-Davidson’s supply base of more than 400 OEM
Suppliers . . . [that] meets 4 times a year in conferences that last 2-3 days,” with
each member contacting nine to twelve other first tier suppliers to get their
views about the company’s actions.148 Although the effort was motivated by the
company’s desire to diffuse best practices and to create an “intimate relationship with [its] suppliers,”149 it had the incidental effect creating a relatively
closed network of strong ties among its key suppliers. Ties among the suppliers’
employees were also created through Harley’s Resident Engineer Program. This
program consisted of “an on-site residency for suppliers to participate in the
development of new products,” in which “[f]ifty full-time resident . . . suppliers
and 80 part time residents take part in new product design . . . this interaction
takes place at the company’s Product Development Center . . . and brings together design, engineering and manufacturing and suppliers” (see Monczka et
al. 2009). In addition, engineers from important suppliers are invited to work at
Harley’s product development center on an as-needed basis.
By embedding its relationships with key suppliers in a closed network,150
Harley ensured that if it behaved badly, word of its misdeeds would quickly
spread throughout its supply base.151 As a consequence, the existence of this
local network made it possible for Harley to, in effect, post its reputation as a
bond, enabling it to more credibly promise its suppliers that it would not
behave opportunistically. The ability to make these credible commitments
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5.4 Conclusion

Recognizing the ways that social and business networks transmit information
(both tacit and explicit), and the ways that transactors can actively create network ties to bond obligations contracts cannot, suggests that the value of a
contractual relationship cannot be properly understood by looking only at the
contracting parties themselves (the transactional dyad). Rather, the network
structure of the relevant market in which the transaction is embedded and the
local (ego) networks around each of the transactors may affect the choice of a
contracting partner, the scope of the discretion given to one’s partner, the type
and amount of information exchanged, the likelihood (discussed further below)
that the supplier will be able to innovate on the buyer’s behalf (along with
whether effective contracts for innovation can be devised) and the types of
governance provisions needed. The reason is simple: the network structure of
a market, the firms’ places in that structure, and the local network around each
firm all affect the self-enforcing range of the parties’ contractual commitments—potentially broadening it well beyond the bilaterally generated selfenforcing range as traditionally defined—as well as the types of value-creating
opportunities that the parties are likely to identify in the future.153
More broadly, once it is recognized that networks have the power to credibly
(though not absolutely) transmit information that is neither observable nor
verifiable, and to at least partially bond obligations whose violation is not serious enough to lead to termination of an otherwise valuable contracting relationships, it becomes clear that unless lawyers pay attention to the network
context of the agreements they draft,154 they will not be able to properly evaluate the value of the transactions their contracts consummate, nor will they be
152 For an overview of Harley’s Supply Strategy, see Milligan & Carbone (2000).
153 Klein & Leffler (1981).
154 Robinson & Stuart (2006, p. 244); see also supra text accompanying notes 126–135.
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was particularly valuable to Harley, given that it needed its suppliers to make
many Harley-specific investments and was attempting to compete with largervolume buyers for its suppliers’ loyalty and attention.152
By creating so many personal ties and interactions among engineers from
different firms, the Harley Resident Engineer Program might also, for reasons
discussed more fully below, have encouraged innovation. As one engineer
working on a power train project with engineers from fifteen suppliers
observed, “being together makes things dynamic . . . It is a huge advantage for
the supplier to talk face-to-face, get in on the prototype stage” (Milligan &
Carbone 2000, p. 63).
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able to structure those contracts to take advantage of the powerful social forces
that can make them more effective contract governance instruments.
6. INNOVATION AND THE MAKE-OR-BUY DECISION

155 Connaughton & Sawchuck (2014, p. 3) (reporting that 69 percent of buyer-respondents viewed
attracting innovative suppliers as being of “critical” or “high” importance); see also Quinn (2000)
(giving multiple examples, but not systematic data, to support the author’s view that outsourcing
innovation has become profitable, widespread and in some contexts necessary for modern firms to
compete).
156 ATKearney (2013). The need for buyers to develop an infrastructure for outsourcing innovation
suggests that there is a high fixed cost for this activity.
157 See, e.g., Vossloh Fastening Systems, Supplier Questionnaire, Version 1.4 (May 2015), http://www.
vossloh-fastening-systems.com/media/downloads/pdfs/sonstiges/Lieferantenselbstauskunft_V14_
20150513.pdf (requiring a three-year forecast for R & D expenditures); Siemens, Questionnaire: SQ
Supplier Self-Description (v2.0-20110101), https://w5.siemens.com/cms/supply-chain-management/en/supplier-at-siemens/download-center/Documents/SSD_en.pdf (“What’s your effort on R
&D (in percent of Total Sales Revenue”).
158 The ISO has a Working Group to design innovation management and measurement standards. See,
e.g., ISO/TC 279 (“Innovation Management) (under development) and ISO/TS 181
Nanotechnologies (“aims to provide the necessary definitions that specify the bounds of key innovation indicators as they relate to nanotechnology”).
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OEM buyers are increasingly interested in dealing with suppliers who can innovate either jointly or on their behalf. They prefer suppliers who are able to
provide both the goods they want today and the goods (some known and some
unknown) that they will want in the future. A 2014 survey of procurement
executives found that “tapping supplier innovation . . . is the second-highest
[procurement] priority, and includes actively attracting and developing the
most innovative suppliers to help generate new ideas.”155 And, a study of the
most innovative firms in Europe found that “innovation leaders better understand the power of their supply base and work collaboratively to involve the
right suppliers as early as possible in the innovation process,” finding that 90%
of the most innovative companies (as compared to 54 percent of other companies) had well-developed and highly structured processes for early supplier
involvement in innovation.156
The importance buyers attach to the prospect of future supplier-involved
innovation is also reflected in supplier qualification questionnaires that require
putative suppliers to disclose their R & D expenditures.157 It is also suggested by
the many recent efforts of international organizations,158 buyers, and private
consulting firms to develop new key performance indicators to quantify suppliers’ propensity to innovate (ATKearney 2014). As one OEM executive explained, “with the partners we’ve had, that we have developed . . . we not only
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159 NOE Respondent.
160 NOE Respondent.
161 OEMs typically require suppliers to disclose information about their local network as part of the
supplier qualification process. They are asked the identity of their most significant contracting
partners and any partners who might be considered competitors of the buyer, along with the
amount of their output they sell to each, together with the percent of their output the proposed
deal would be.
Do you deliver to competitors of COMPANY . . . if so, please tell us. . . Please give the
names of your most important COMPANYs [you deal with]. . .including percentage of
your sales to them. . .[and] In your perception, what would be the mutual dependence
that you perceive to be acceptable in a business relationship with COMPANY?
(Expressed as percentage of sales, market position, relation to competitors, etc.
Supplier Questionnaire from Large International OEM (name withheld on request). Knowledge of
network structure is valuable to buyers for a number of reasons. First, it helps them assess the
supplier’s bankruptcy risk. If a supplier sells a large portion of its output to a buyer who is known to
be opportunistic or who operates in an industry where there is highly variable and unpredictable
downstream demand for its product, that buyer may well have the power to bankrupt or seriously
jeopardize the supplier’s business. Second, this information sometimes helps a buyer assess the cost
of monitoring quality or overseeing the supplier’s production line. If, for example, the supplier is
selling the good to a firm in a regulated industry where components must meet precise specifications
(such as the production of an MRI machine) or to a buyer like John Deere who exercises detailed
oversight of its suppliers’ production lines, the monitoring costs of buying from that supplier will be
far lower than if the firm were not selling to these types of buyers. Third, network information may
also impact the value of particular contract provisions. For example, some large OEMs who solesource some parts are concerned about suppliers holding them up on price, so they include a mostfavored-nation pricing provision in their contracts. This provision gives them the right to buy the
goods at the lowest price the supplier charges to any other buyer. The suppliers’ local network can
dramatically affect the value of this provision. If the supplier is selling the good to only four other
firms who are all sole-sourced to it, the clause is of little value. On the other hand, if the supplier is
selling the good to fifty buyers, a significant number of whom multi-source the part, the most
favored nations clause makes it far less likely that the supplier will be able to hold the buyer up on
price. Fourth, buyers worried about technology leakage might be far more comfortable dealing with
suppliers whose local networks involve buyers in other industries. Finally, as discussed further
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look at what they have today, we think [about whether] we can develop a
product in the future together.”159 And, as another put it, “if you develop
the right relationship with your supply base, you can have . . . additional
brains thinking about ways to improve your product.”160
Although a supplier’s dedication to R & D and its creation of governance
frameworks for innovation are important to buyers, a buyer’s choice of supplier
in a context where supplier-led innovation or joint innovation is contemplated
may also be strongly influenced by various aspects of the network around the
supplier—such as whether the supplier sells the part (or even parts with related
technologies) mostly to firms in the buyer’s industry or to buyers in multiple
industries. Interestingly, OEMs typically explore these and other aspects of the
supplier’s local network in some detail during the supplier qualification
process.161
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below, the structure of a supplier’s local network may be of interest to the buyer because it may
influence the likelihood that that the supplier will be able to innovate on behalf of the buyer in the
future, see infra Part V. The economic value of this information is indicated by the fact that commercial companies have begun to sell it. The Bloomberg Business database now has information on
all public companies and their public suppliers as well as partial information on privately held
companies. Another start up, Spiderbook.com, which is currently in beta testing, also trolls the web
for public information from both the SEC and the trade press and compiles information about
buyer and supplier webs of commercial relationships. Similar information is also provided by
SCImarket.com, though it currently contains information only about publicly traded companies.
162 In such a situation a buyer is unlikely to be faced with the so-called “innovator’s dilemma,” which
arises when a buyer wants to get the benefit of the tacit knowledge a supplier obtains from other
buyers but does not want the supplier to share the tacit knowledge learned from him with his other
buyers (Christensen 1997).
163 Such a supplier may have an advantage in that if the industry norm is rather static, it will be in a
better position to move down the learning curve of production.
164 Similarly, some suppliers seek a diversified buyer base so that they can learn from their customers.
When a Supplier in the NOE study was asked if it was an advantage to work in “multiple end user
industries,” the supplier explained that in deciding who to sell to the answer to the question “are we
learning from them?” was a key criterion. See also Alcacer & Oxley (2012). Another advantage of this
structure is that if a supplier “leaks” tacit or even explicit information to its other customers, it will
not be to the buyer’s competitors. As a consequence, buyers are more likely to share information of
all types with these industry-diversified suppliers, again increasing the likelihood that they will
innovate.
165 See Burt (2005, 74–76), and sources cited therein.

Downloaded from http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/ at Serials Department on November 1, 2016

In contexts where the buyer’s goal is simply to keep up with the industry
norm with respect to the quality and characteristics of the part, the buyer may
prefer to purchase from a supplier who sells the part primarily to others in its
industry.162 Such a supplier is in a good position to pool the nonintellectual
property-based tacit knowledge from other industry members and is likely to
produce a product that conforms to the industry norm.163
In contrast, a buyer who wants its suppliers to innovate on its behalf may
prefer to purchase from a supplier who sells to buyers in many industries.164
Such a supplier will have access to more distinct sets of both explicit and tacit
knowledge; it is therefore more likely to innovate with respect to the part in
question than a supplier without access to diverse sets of information.165 As a
leading network sociologist explained, “[p]eople with . . . early access to diverse,
often contradictory, information and interpretations . . . [have] a competitive
advantage in seeing and developing good ideas,” and are at “higher risk [that is,
likelihood] of having good ideas . . . [because] ways of thinking and behaving
are more homogeneous within than between groups, so people connected to
otherwise segregated groups are more likely to be familiar with alternative
ways of thinking and behaving, which gives them the option of selecting and
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166 Interview with CEO of a Cable-Industry-Related Start-up (Nov. 9, 2015). The CEO explained that he
hired about 80% from outside of the cable industry, so that his employees would bring new ideas to
the table. For a discussion of the ways that good and innovative ideas originate and empirical
evidence that information within groups tends to be more homogeneous than information across
groups and that firms with more open networks are likely to be more innovative, see Burt (2005, 63,
69, 90 & Ch. 3) (reporting the results of a study of purchasing managers which found that “better
ideas [for improving the company] came from the purchasing managers, whose work brought them
into contact with other companies,” and more parts of their own companies); see also Hargadon
(2003) (exploring the role of networks that bridge different markets or information sets in facilitating technological innovation).
167 The Tadelis and Williamson articulation of the Williamson theory of the firm assumes that in most
instances innovation (bilateral adaption) can best be accomplished within the firm due to the
combination of low-powered incentives and administrative fiat made available by intra-firm hierarchy, see Tadelis & Williamson (2012). However, sociological studies of the forces that drive
successful innovation suggest that “when knowledge is broadly distributed and brings a competitive
advantage, the locus of innovation is found in a network of interorganizational relationships,” rather
than within any single organizational entity, and the benefit any given firm reaps from innovation is
closely tied to its position in the relevant network of firms. See Powell & Koput (1996).
168 Although there are no studies testing this link, in large part because metrics rating a firm’s innovativeness have not traditionally been available, these metrics are in the final stage of development by
both private consulting firms and the International Standards Organization, see supra note 159.
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synthesizing alternatives.”166 Indeed, the social capital literature is replete with
examples demonstrating that individuals with access to more diverse sources of
information are more likely to come up with new and innovative ideas than
individuals who have access only or primarily to ideas from a relatively closed
group that interacts primarily with its own members—like a division of a large
bureaucratic firm producing a good solely for intra-firm consumption.
Interestingly, the move by firms to outsource or co-develop R&D/innovation
occurred in tandem with the development of the contract governance
approaches described here. These approaches, which depend for their effectiveness on the existence of relationship-specific social capital and the availability of network governance, enable buyer firms to enjoy many of the benefits of
intra-firm production—such as low-powered incentives and the coordination
benefits associated with hierarchy—while engaging in market transactions. This
suggests that in thinking about the determination of firm boundaries in the
modern economy, the decision to “buy” is much more involved than simply
using an arm’s-length market-mediated contract and the decision to “make” is
not the only way to secure the benefits of low-powered incentives and hierarchically managed projects.167 It also reveals that the network structure of the
relevant industry, which in turn strongly influences the types of inter-firm
commitments that can be adequately bonded, may also play a key role in a
firm’s make-or-buy decision in a particular context.168
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7. CONCLUSION

In sum, understanding the formal mechanisms and social capital-related forces
that make these relational contracts work suggests that relational governance is
more expensive to implement than is generally recognized.169 Yet, it also reveals
that relational governance can create benefits for the contracting parties that go
far beyond the particular transactions in which it is used.170 As compared to

170 The arguments advanced in the text have implications for the management literature’s perspective on
when relational contracts should be used and how they create value in certain transactional contexts.
Management scholars suggest that self-enforcing relational contracts create four types of benefits. First,
they decrease contracting costs because of a reduced need for specification (and with it more effective
deterrence, since all possible sources of opportunism can rarely be specified in a contract). Second, they
decrease monitoring costs “because self-enforcement relies on self-monitoring rather than external or
third party monitoring.” Third, they reduce “the costs associated with complex adaptation, thereby
allowing exchange partners to adjust the agreement ‘on the fly’ to respond to unforeseen market changes.”
And, finally, “self enforcing agreements are superior to contracts at minimizing transaction costs over the
long run because they are not subject to the time limitations of contracts,” which are assumed to be valid
over only a specified period of time. Dyer & Singh (1998). However, as the description and analysis
presented here suggests that, during the early stages of contracting relationships, trust is most likely to
evolve when obligations are well specified and the tools used to determine whether goods are up to
specifications are accurate and their output transparent. These measurement mechanisms are costly to
create and administer. However, these costs are often overlooked because these theorists tend to focus on
the benefits of relational governance, once the cost of developing the relationship-specific capital that
supports it has already been borne. Furthermore, the monitoring costs involved in self-enforcing agreements are unlikely to be lower than in contracts designed to be enforced in court, because in both contexts
it is a contracting party, not a third party, who must detect any breach. As for the purported “adjustments
on the fly,” these are routinely made against the background of formal contracts, sometimes informally
and sometimes through the filing and acceptance of a change order or a contractual modification. Finally,
once it is recognized that the use of Master Agreements followed by purchase orders is the dominant
mode of doing business in these markets, the claim that contracts have built-in time limitations ceases to
be an important consideration. Moreover, even when contracting parties do use time-limited contracts,
many aspects of these agreements are determined by the buyer’s standard terms and conditions as well as
the variety of handbooks and manuals, and it is routine for parties to simply enter into agreements
extending former agreements, making re-contracting costs in these contexts far lower than these theorists
implicitly assume. If these rather illusory benefits were the most important benefits created by relational
governance, it would rarely be worth its cost given the costs of the formal and other supports it requires to
function in transactions between complex organizations. Yet once it is recognized that legally enforceable
contracts, no matter how well specified, cannot meaningfully govern certain types of obligations—for
example the interior promises in a complex agreement, or contracts for innovation that involve many
judgment calls with potential distributional impacts—it becomes clear that there are contexts where
relationalism may be worth its cost, properly reckoned.
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169 Even in the New York diamond industry—where the social capital underlying contractual relationships has an organic basis in the religious and community ties among its members—the Diamond
Dealers Club, the bourse where most transactions are concluded, has adopted written rules and
created costly contract adjudication and enforcement institutions to support these agreements. See
Bernstein (1992). Similarly, in the cash cotton industry which was deeply embedded in the culture of
the Old South, the industry created a variety of rules, information channels, and dispute resolution
tribunals to support trade and make nonlegal sanctions an important and effective contract governance mechanism. See Bernstein (2001).
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